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INTRODUCTION
Derivative securities-financial instruments whose value derives
from some other, more fundamental, asset-have gone from obscu-
rity and the arcane to the front pages of newspapers and the forefront
of the legislative agenda in a very short time span. This change has
occurred because a diverse set of investors, from hedge funds, corpo-
rations, and money market mutual funds to non-profit organizations,
have posted large losses on derivative investments. For example,
David Askin's billion dollar hedge fund filed for bankruptcy having
lost virtually all of its investors' $600 million in equity after failing to
meet margin calls on mortgage-backed securities in its portfolio.'
Procter & Gamble lost $102 million on interest rate swap contracts
(roughly 15 cents per share).2 Barings PLC, a British investment
bank, failed due to losses in Nikkei index futures and options posi-
tions taken by a trader in its Singapore office.' BankAmerica had to
put over $60 million into two of its Pacific Horizon money market
funds to maintain their value at $1 a share in the wake of derivative
losses and investor withdrawals.4 Odessa College, a small community
college in Texas, lost virtually half the value of its $22 million endow-
ment when it invested the entire endowment in mortgage-based deriv-
atives.' A German firm, Metallgesellschaft, A.G., lost over $1 billion
on oil futures contracts used to hedge long-term supply contracts with
oil customers and had to be bailed out by banks.6 And in the biggest
1. Did Dealers Gang Up on David Askin ?, INSrrrUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1994, at 84; Askin
Chokes on Lack of Liquidity, INVESTMENT DEALERs' DIGEST, Mortgage-Backed Securities Let-
ter, Apr. 4, 1994, vol. 9, No. 14.
2. Glenn Collins, P. & G. Posts Improved Net in 4th Quarter, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1994, at
D3.
3. Nicholas Bray & Lawrence Ingrassia, Losses at Barings Grow to $1.24 Billion; Authori-
ties Begin Sale of 'Good' Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A3.
4. Sara Calian, BankAmerica's Cost to Rescue 2 Funds Soars, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1994, at
A2.
5. G. Bruce Knecht, I Owe U. How a Texas College Mortgaged Its Future in Derivatives
Debacle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at Al.
6. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Trying to Rescue a Soured Oil Bet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at D1;
Jeffrey Taylor & Allanna Sullivan, German Firm Faces Big Losses on Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 1994, at Cl.
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story on this side of the Atlantic, one of the wealthiest counties in the
United States, Orange County, California, filed for bankruptcy be-
cause of over $1 billion in losses on investments in structured notes,
the value of which fell sharply when interest rates rose in the fall of
1994.7
In reaction to this spate of investor losses, congressional interest
in derivatives regulation heated up. Between April and October 1994,
Congress held ten hearings on derivatives.' In addition, numerous
bills were introduced in the 103d Congress proposing the expansion
of the regulation of derivatives or a reorganization of the regulation of
financial markets.9 A bill regulating derivatives was one of several
pieces of legislation introduced by the new House Banking Commit-
7. Floyd Norris, Bonds Roiled by Orange County Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at DI.
8. Risks that Hedge Funds Pose to the Banking System: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 13, 1994); Derivative Financial
Markets (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10, 19, & 25, 1994); Review of
Reports by the US. General Accounting Office and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on
Derivative Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Credit and Rural Development
of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1994); H.R. 4503, the Deriv-
atives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1994); H.R. 4503, Derivatives Safety
and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 12, 1994); Derivative Financial Markets (Part 2): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 13, 1994); The Condition of the Bank and Thrift Industries:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 22, 1994); Mutual Fund Industry (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept 27,
1994); U.S. Competition and Trade Policy in the Global Economy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 28, 1994); Recent Deriva-
tive Losses: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (Oct. 5, 1994).
9. See S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (prohibiting insured depository institu-
tions and credit unions from engaging in certain activities involving derivative instru-
ments); S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (separating certain activities involving
derivative instruments from the insured deposits of insured depository institutions and
providing for regulatory coordination in establishing principles related to the activities);
H.R. 1214, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (providing for the regulation of banks and savings
associations by a single federal, independent regulatory commission); H.R. 2550, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (establishing a Markets and Trading Commission to combine the
functions of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities Exchange
Commission into a single independent agency); H.R. 3748, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(providing an enhanced framework for federal financial institution regulation of derivative
activities); H.R. 4170, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (amending the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act and the Federal Credit Union Act to require insured depository institutions to
include information on derivative financial instruments in condition reports); H.R. 4261,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (establishing the Commission on International Coordination
of Financial Regulation); H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (enhancing the supervi-
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tee chairman, James Leach, as the 104th Congress commenced opera-
tions in January 1995.10 In addition, in May 1994 the General
Accounting Office reported to Congress that greater regulation was
needed." There is irony in this flurry of activity, as the previous Con-
gress in 1992 had instructed the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) to exempt many of the same derivative financial
instruments from its regulatory authority.12 Despite heightened con-
gressional concern and reported losses, regulators have been hesitant
to support sweeping new regulatory initiatives beyond narrow propos-
als directed primarily at enhanced disclosure.I3
The increased attention paid to derivative securities follows ex-
plosive growth in a market that barely existed a little over a decade
ago. The market for financial derivatives is in the trillions of dollars
(see Table I below), although its precise size is difficult to ascertain
because there is no accurate mechanism for tracking a substantial seg-
ment of the market, off-exchange-traded contracts, as there is for ex-
change-traded ones. In addition, the notional value of derivative
contracts such as swaps, the market measure currently collected by
regulators, does not reflect the investment at risk.
Very few citizens, let alone public officials, are well informed
about derivative instruments, despite the recent attention and the
large size of the market. The depth of the business community's
knowledge of these instruments is also questionable. Some scholars,
for example, have suggested that a significant part of Metallgesell-
schaft's loss was due to its banks' faulty understanding of the firm's
hedging strategy. 4 In addition, a recent accountants' study found
that many investment management companies have inadequate risk
measurement and control for the derivative products they use.'5
Moreover, in the popular press and to the average citizen, "deriva-
sion and regulation of derivative activities of financial institutions); H.R. 4745, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) (same).
10. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (providing a framework to improve risk-
management techniques at financial institutions, including the prudential use of derivative
products).
11. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PRO-
TECT THE FINANCIAL SYsTrEM 14-15 (May 1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
12. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590,
3629-32 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1994)).
13. Keith Bradsher, Regulators See No Need for Tougher Rules on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1995, at D12.
14. E.g., Christopher L. Culp & Steve H. Hanke, Derivative Dingbats, INT'L ECON. 12
(July/Aug. 1994).
15. Michael R. Sesit, Derivatives'Risks Remain Unchecked, WALL ST.J., Sept. 19, 1995, at
Cl (Ernst & Young survey of 143 investment concerns).
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tives," much like speculation, has become a dirty word, hindering in-
formed discussion.
TABLE 1
NOTIONAL/CONTRACT AMOUNTS OF DERIVATWVES HELD BY
PRODUCT
TYPE FROM YEAR-END 1989-1992
(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)*
DERIVATIVE PERCENT
INSTRUMENT 1989 1990 1991 1992 INCREASE
Forwardsa $3,034 $4,437 $6,061 $7,515 148%
Futures 1,259 1,540 2,254 3,154 151%
Options 953 1,305 1,841 2,263 137%
Swaps 11952 2,890 3,872 4,711 141%
TOTAL $7,198 $10,172 $14,028 $17,643 145%
* The information in this table was taken from the GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 36.
Includes foreign exchange, forward-rate agreements, equity and commodity forwards.
Notwithstanding the spectacular losses borne by certain investors
in derivatives, these instruments serve important economic functions
that cannot be overemphasized. The bulwark of derivative markets is
the hedging of price risk. Successful risk management reduces the
cost of doing business, thereby lowering prices to consumers. Because
the demand of business hedgers is rarely met by hedgers on the other
side of the market, speculators play an essential role in derivative mar-
kets. The largest derivatives losers in the recent past were, indeed,
speculating. 6 In addition, derivative markets serve a price-discovery
function for the underlying assets. Because it is cheaper and faster to
complete transactions in derivatives than in cash or spot markets (the
market for the underlying assets), informed traders, whose activities
change prices, trade in derivative markets.
The relatively recent origins and the technical complexity of de-
rivative instrnuments-investment firms hire Ph.D.s in mathematics
and physics as well as in financial economics to analyze products-
make it difficult for the uninitiated to evaluate the risks, and hence
the regulatory strategies, appropriate for this market sector. This in-
creases the danger that with a political process prone to implement
16. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. Metallgesellschaft is arguably the only
exception. The regulatory response to inappropriate speculation is discussed infra notes
238-252 and accompanying text.
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regulatory changes in crisis mode, 7 poor policy choices will be made.
For in the absence of familiarity with the issues, people tend to judge
the relative frequency of an event by the accessibility of the event in
their cognitive processes, that is, by the striking, particular occur-
rence, which may have nothing to do with the event's actual fre-
quency."t Accordingly, in policymakers' mental calculations, the
recent huge losses on certain derivatives transactions experienced by
particular investors will outweigh the less visible yet more pervasive
benefits of derivatives. The point of this Article is to decrease the like-
lihood of such an outcome by making the important and technically
demanding financial derivative markets and their regulatory environ-
ment more transparent to the nonprofessional.
The plan of this Article is to describe first the three fundamental
derivative instruments: forward contracts, futures contracts, and op-
tions. Financial engineering has created an extensive array of instru-
ments from more basic derivatives, and the Article then reviews three
types of instruments engineered from the more elemental forms:
swaps, mortgage-based derivatives, and structured notes. These more
complex products have been most frequently linked in the news to
investor losses and are a focus of regulatory concern. Each type of
derivative is explained in depth, and historical and institutional detail
concerning the instruments' markets, regulatory structure, and uses is
provided.
Although derivative products are more technically challenging to
understand than conventional financial instruments such as stocks
and bonds, it is my belief that it is not terribly difficult for a non-
specialist to develop the economic intuition necessary to appreciate
what is going on in this market.19 More important, if current efforts at
regulatory reform are to be for the better, policymakers, legislators,
and the broader public must develop an understanding and apprecia-
tion of these important instruments and markets.
17. For an insightful explanation of Congress's approach to regulatory oversight as a
crisis-responding fire alarm, rather than as a preventative police patrol, see Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM.J. POL. ScI. 165 (1984).
18. Social psychologists term this phenomenon the "availability heuristic." RICHARD
NISBEIT & LEE Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCAL JUDC-
MENT 18-19 (1980).
19. While characterized even in the business press as exotic, derivatives actually per-
vade everyday life. For example, a shopper who receives a rain check on a sale item that is
sold out has received a derivative called an option. A homeowner with a variable-rate mort-
gage featuring an annual interest rate ceiling owns a specially denominated option, an
interest rate cap.
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I. FORWARD CONTRACTS
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy or
sell an asset at a specified future time, referred to as the delivery date,
for a specified price. For instance, a U.S. corporation may contract in
June with a bank to buy pounds sterling in September, when it will be
closing on a purchase of goods for its United Kingdom subsidiary.
The contract fixes the exchange rate (the dollar price) that the com-
pany will pay for the pounds in three months. The party agreeing to
buy the asset (the parent corporation in this example) assumes what is
referred to as a "long position" in the forward contract. The party
who is the asset seller (the bank in this example) assumes what is re-
ferred to as a "short position." A forward contract creates an obliga-
tion: the buyer of the contract must purchase the underlying asset
from the seller of the contract at the contract's expiration date, and
the seller must deliver the asset to the buyer, for the agreed-upon
price. By fixing in the present the price at which the underlying asset
will be acquired (sold) in the future, forward contracting reduces the
risk of loss from adverse price changes and thereby reduces the cost of
doing business.
No money or goods change hands at the time a forward contract
is entered into; a forward contract is settled at maturity. This differs
from transactions for the underlying assets, which take place in what
are referred to as cash or spot markets. In such markets, goods or
services purchased or sold are immediately transferred and paid for.
The value of a forward contract depends on the value of the underly-
ing asset. At the time the contract is entered into, the contract has a
value of zero (neither party pays anything and neither receives any-
thing of monetary value). Thereafter, a contract's value may increase
or decrease as the market price of the underlying asset changes. If the
asset increases in value after the contract is created, the value of the
long position becomes positive and the value of the short position be-
comes negative.20 At expiration, the value is the difference between
20. Putting prices into the text's example of a forward currency contract better illus-
trates the symmetry of losses and gains in forward contracts. Suppose the exchange rate set
in the U.S. corporation's contract for pounds is $1.5769 per pound, and that after the
corporation and bank enter into the contract, the Bank of England unexpectedly raises
interest rates, while U.S. rates remain unchanged. This action makes the value of the
pound increase in terms of the dollar, and the spot price per pound rises, say to $1.5969.
In this situation, the corporation has experienced a gain on its forward contract-it has the
right to buy pounds at $1.5769 per pound-a price $.02 below what it would now have to
pay to buy pounds in the spot market. The bank has correspondingly experienced a loss
on the contract-it will have to sell pounds to the corporation for $1.5769-a price $.02
below what it would receive if it sold pounds in the cash market. A key characteristic of a
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the contract price and the spot price of the asset, the profit (or loss)
on the contract.
Forward contracts have a long history, going as far back as medie-
val trade fairs where "merchants often contracted for deferred deliv-
ery of goods at a price agreed to in advance." 1 The first forward
contract in grain in the United States was developed in Chicago in the
mid-1800s, the "to-arrive" contract, in which a farmer agreed to de-
liver grain at a future date for a specified price.2 2 The most important
forward contract market today involves foreign currency (also re-
ferred to as foreign exchange). The shift to floating exchange rates
with the collapse in the early 1970s of the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates dramatically increased exchange rate volatility
and led to expansive development of the forward currency market.23
Global daily turnover in forward transactions in foreign exchange to-
day is estimated to exceed $400 billion.24
There are no organized exchanges or special physical facilities for
forward currency trading. The market is largely an interbank market:
transactions are entered into between financial institutions and their
clients and traded across these entities. Informal communication
channels exist between major financial institutions that make the mar-
ket. Contract terms, such as the quantity of currency exchanged, are
not standardized and vary with participants' needs. There is no spe-
cial federal regulatory regime for forward contracts; they are governed
by state contract law. 5
The risk-management feature of forward contracts is straightfor-
ward. The farmer planting grain in April is uncertain about the price
he will receive for the grain when it is harvested in July. If there is an
abundant harvest, July prices will be low, but if there is a poor harvest,
they will be high. The farmer is therefore exposed to considerable
risk. The miller, the buyer of the farmer's grain, is also subject to
substantial risk. If grain prices rise, his production costs will rise. The
farmer and miller can eliminate this risk-price uncertainty-by ne-
forward contract, as the example illustrates, is that it is a zero-sum game. One side's gain
exactly equals the other side's loss.
21. DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 226-27 (3d ed. 1995).
22. Id. at 227.
23. The Bretton Woods system pegged non-U.S. currencies to the U.S. dollar, which
was convertible into gold at $35 per ounce. For a brief discussion of the system and its
demise see ALA C. SHAPIRO, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 113-15 (4th ed.
1992).
24. GROUP OF 30, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICE AND PRIN-
cPL.s 30 n.1 (July 1993).
25. The banks making these markets, however, face a variety of federal regulation. See
infra text accompanying notes 173-185.
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gotiating a contract in April that fixes the price to be paid for the
grain in July. The farmer, who is short the contract, shifts the risk of
selling at a lower price in July to the long, the miller in this example.
The long (the miller) shifts the risk of having to buy wheat at a higher
price in July to the short (the farmer).
Trading to reduce risk is called hedging, and it is a primary rea-
son for the existence of forward markets. The hedger takes a position
in the forward market that is the opposite of his position in the cash
market. In this example, the farmer is long in the wheat market (he
owns the grain) and consequently he is short in the forward contract,
while the miller is short in the wheat market (he does not own grain)
and is long in the forward contract. Hedging does not increase an
investment's returns; it simply makes a variable outcome more certain.
Indeed, if asset prices are equally likely to go up or down in the fu-
ture, the outcome with the hedge will be worse half of the time than
had there been no hedge. For example, ifJuly wheat prices rise above
the April contract price, the farmer is worse off than had he not en-
tered into the forward contract, for he has to sell the wheat at the
lower contract price. He is only better off ex post with the forward
contract than without it if the July wheat price drops, for then he is
able to sell the wheat at the higher forward contract price. The hedge
thus protects him from loss at the cost of reducing the maximum gain
he can achieve from selling his wheat should the market move in his
favor.
As there may not be an equal number of short and long hedgers,
forward markets need other traders willing to bear risk-investors
who seek to profit from their guesses concerning the direction of fu-
ture price changes. These traders are called speculators. If such trad-
ers expect prices to rise, they take a long position in the forward
market. If they expect prices to fall, they go short. Hedging shifts
risks from those who do not wish to bear them, such as farmers and
millers, to those investors who are willing to do so, speculators, who
are not in the grain business. Nineteenth century grain speculators
found that they could buy and sell the to-arrive contracts rather than
the grain itself and thereby speculate on grain prices without having
to concern themselves with taking delivery and storing grain.26 This
development in forward contracting was the progenitor of futures
contracts, and the same hedging and speculative strategies apply to
futures contracts: farmers sell and millers buy futures contracts to
26. See CHANCE, supra note 21, at 227.
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hedge their cash market positions, and investors buy or sell futures
contracts in accordance with their views of future spot prices.
II. FUTURES CONTRACTS
A. Essential Institutional Features
Futures contracts are standardized forward contracts. They are
obligations to buy or sell an asset at a specified future date for a speci-
fied price, and no money changes hands until maturity. The differ-
ence is that with the standardization of contract terms, the futures
contracts are readily transferrable. Futures contracts are publicly
traded on exchanges, entities that provide an organized marketplace
for transactions, that is, a centralized location where buyers and sellers
meet. Like forward contracts, futures contracts have been in exist-
ence for a long time. The earliest known futures contracts were rice
contracts sold in Japan in the 1600s.27
Futures contracts today are written on a wide variety of physical
commodities and financial assets, including agricultural commodities,
precious metals and natural resources, foreign currencies, and finan-
cial instruments such as fixed-income obligations and stock indices.
Futures exchanges develop contracts that they believe will induce suf-
ficient demand to be successfully marketed. Two key features of suc-
cessful futures contracts are (1) volatility in the price of the
underlying asset, which is the source of user demand for a futures
contract, the desire to reduce price risk, and (2) homogeneous units
of the asset, which is a feature that eliminates disputes over value and
guarantees abundant supply so that market competition sets prices.
Because a primary use of futures contracts is to reduce price risk, turn-
over in contracts offered indicates change in the volatility of asset
prices. For instance, contracts on agricultural products, such as
ketchup and butter, whose prices became predictable as production
and shipping technology improved, are no longer traded.
The largest futures exchanges are the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Merc). The CBOT's
1993 market share of U.S. futures exchanges' contract-trading volume
was approximately two-fifths, and the Merc's was approximately one-
third.2 ' The total number of contracts outstanding is referred to as
the "open interest"; as each contract has a long and a short side, the
27. S. Waite Rawls Ill & Charles W. Smithson, The Evolution of Risk Management Products,
in THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 2-15 to -16 (Robert
J. Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1990).
28. CHANCE, supra note 21, at 236-37.
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two sides together count as one contract. Trading on futures ex-
changes takes place in ring-shaped pits in a process known as "open
outcry," by which traders use hand signals and oral communications
to place bids and make offers simultaneously. This pure auction
mode of trading differs from the mechanisms for trading securities.
Stock exchanges typically use a system of specialists -individuals who
have exclusive rights to make the market in specific stocks listed on
the exchange-and there is a multiple dealer market-maker system
for stocks traded over-the-counter (unlisted stocks). For the most ac-
tively traded unlisted stocks, dealers place their quotes on the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers' Automatic Quotation System
(NASDAQ), an electronic quotation system available to market
participants.
Futures exchanges set the standardized terms of their contracts,
which involve, among other items, contract size, quotation unit, mini-
mum price fluctuation, delivery terms and procedures, and contract
duration. For example, the CBOT contract for U.S. Treasury bonds
specifies, among others, the following terms: delivery months of
March, June, September, and December; a contract size of $100,000; a
minimum price change of 1/32 ($31.25); the last trading day as the
business day prior to the last seven days of the contract month; the
first delivery date as the first business day of the contract month; a
deliverable bond as a bond with a maturity over fifteen years that is
not callable within fifteen years.29 There is also a specified conversion
formula that adjusts the settlement price for the particular bond
delivered.
Most contracts have price limits, which place a limit on the maxi-
mum daily price change that can occur. When a contract moves be-
yond its price limit, no transactions are allowed at prices above or
below the limit on that day. The purpose of price limits is to prevent
large price movements due to allegedly speculative excesses and
thereby allow for stable markets in the face of new information. Not
only do price limits distort the relation between futures and cash mar-
ket prices, which have no limits on price fluctuation, but price limits
also do not stop trends. Thus, a contract hitting a daily limit may do
so several days in succession. In this situation, daily limits can have
serious consequences. Investors with losses on a contract will be un-
able to liquidate their positions: as trading quickly reaches the limit
and as other market participants refuse to trade within the permissible
range, trading ceases until the following day when a new limit will be
29. Id. at 231-32.
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in force. Some contract markets, therefore, prescribe expansion in
the price limit when prices hit the limit for an extended period (re-
ferred to as variable limits). In addition, in some contract markets,
daily price limits apply only to certain times of day (such as the con-
tract open). In others, limits are eliminated in the contract delivery
month, to ensure convergence between futures and cash market
prices.
The CBOT introduced the first futures contract in financial assets
in 1975, an interest rate futures contract on Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) pass-through certificates."0
Although financial futures are recent products compared to most
physical commodity futures contracts, they dominate futures markets
today. Over half of the total volume of contracts traded on U.S. fu-
tures exchanges is in financial futures.3" The most important category
of contracts, by trading volume and value, is interest rate futures.
These contracts have grown exponentially with the corresponding
dramatic increase in the volatility of interest rates since the Federal
Reserve's 1979 shift in focus from the level of interest rates to growth
of the money supply.3 2 For example, from 1979 to 1985, the standard
deviation of monthly returns more than doubled." As a result of this
new business environment, financial institutions, corporations, and
other investors have increasingly sought to reduce their interest rate
exposure. Additionally, foreign currency futures trading has risen
steadily, alongside the much larger forward market, following the in-
crease in exchange rate volatility after the Bretton Woods fixed-ex-
change rate system was abandoned in the early 1970s."4 In 1991 the
total value of interest rate and currency futures contracts worldwide
was approximately $2.2 trillion. 3
A principal consequence of the difference between futures and
forwards, contract standardization, is greater ease in the trading of
contracts. Because contract terms are standardized, traders can close
out a position by engaging in an opposing transaction (the long sells a
contract and the short buys a contract). They do not have to take or
make physical delivery of the underlying asset, as they would if con-
30. Id. at 227.
31. See, e.g., id. at 236 fig. 7.1; id. at 261 tbl. 7.6.
32. Stanley B. Block & TimothyJ. Gallagher, The Use of Interest Rate Futures and Options
by Corporate Financial Managers, 15 FIN. MGNrr. 73, 74 (Autumn 1986).
33. Id. The range in short-term interest rates was 1200 basis points during this period.
Id.
34. See SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 118.
35. GROUP oF 30, supra note 24, at 32 n.5. The General Accounting Office's estimate of
the value of such contracts for 1992 is over $3 trillion. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 187.
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tract terms were idiosyncratic, rendering it difficult or expensive to
find someone willing to assume their side of the contract. This fea-
ture of futures contracts increases the willingness of investors outside
of the industry of the underlying asset to assume the price risk that
hedgers are seeking to unload. The outsider does not have to deal
with the details of trading the actual commodity, as he can close out
his position by offset. The shift from forward to futures contracts low-
ers trading costs and expands market participation, thereby reducing
the cost of hedging.
Just as with a forward contract, changes in the price of the under-
lying asset produce the opposite effect on the value of the two sides to
a futures contract. What the buyer, or long, gains if the asset's value at
the delivery date is above the futures price, the seller, or short, loses.
The opposite holds for decreases in asset value. In contrast to forward
markets, however, buyers of futures contracts, in the vast majority of
transactions, do not take actual possession of the good, and sellers do
not deliver it. Instead, each closes out his position prior to the deliv-
ery date by purchasing (or selling) the other side of the contract.
Those who bought or sold the contract to hedge a spot purchase or
sale then purchase or sell the underlying asset in the spot market.
The gain or loss on the futures contract offsets the corresponding loss
or gain on the spot market transaction. For asset buyers, this strategy
avoids the possibility of receiving a product of undesired quality, be-
cause, in order to minimize the possibility of market manipulation,
contracts permit the delivery of a variety of grades of the commodity,
with corresponding price adjustments, and the short controls the
delivery. 6
It must be noted that even though cash settlement (by contract
reversal) is the most typical method of settlement in futures markets,
the physical delivery option is critical; it establishes the pricing rela-
tion between futures and spot markets. Because the underlying asset
can be delivered at the expiration of the futures contract, the prices in
both markets must be equal on the contract's expiration date. Other-
wise, traders can engage in arbitrage and earn risk-free profits. For
example, if at expiration the futures ,price was higher than the spot
price, a trader could sell the contract, buy the underlying asset in the
36. See infra text accompanying notes 55, 74-87.
37. Arbitrage is the buying of something at one price and the simultaneous selling of it
or something equivalent at a higher price. In competitive markets, investors flock to ex-
ploit an arbitrage opportunity, and their demand for the cheaper item and concomitant
supply of the higher priced item eliminates the price differential. Accordingly, the ability
to earn arbitrage profits in such markets is, at best, small and fleeting.
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spot market, and deliver the asset on the contract. This would lock in
a sure profit equal to the difference in contract and spot market
prices. This arbitrage relation continues to define the futures price
prior to expiration, adjusted for factors bearing differentially on the
futures and asset holders. The cost of storing the commodity (which
only the asset holder bears) and the opportunity cost of capital or the
interest foregone (a futures holder earns interest because he does not
pay for the asset until the contract matures) raise the futures price
compared to the spot price; they are referred to as the "cost of carry"
(the cost of carrying the asset in one's portfolio over the term of the
futures contract).
Table 2 (below) provides a simple numerical example of the arbi-
trage principle linking futures and spot prices. Because the futures
price is higher than that predicted by the pricing relation, an investor
can make a sure profit, with no out-of-pocket cash investment, by bor-
rowing to buy the asset and selling the futures contract. Upon the
expiration of the contract, the investor delivers the asset, pays back
the loan, and receives the futures price. The result is a fixed profit
regardless of the asset's price at the contract's expiration and it
amounts to the mispricing of the futures contract. Because the profit
is fixed from the outset when the investor commences the strategy,
the strategy is termed risk-free arbitrage. As investors rush to buy the
underpriced asset and sell the overpriced futures contract, the imbal-
ance of supply and demand pushes the futures price down and the
asset price up, realigning prices in accordance with the predicted rela-
tion and eliminating the opportunity for arbitrage profits.
As a consequence of arbitrage, futures markets have an important
price-discovery function for the underlying spot markets. Individuals
with information that the future direction of spot prices will be differ-
ent from what current prices suggest will trade in the futures markets.
Their activity conveys information about prices and moves spot mar-
ket prices in the correct direction. Individuals with new information
trade in futures rather than cash markets because it is cheaper and
more effective to trade in futures markets. Transaction costs are
lower, and trades can be executed more quickly in futures markets.
This permits the exploitation of smaller price differentials. In addi-
tion, futures markets can absorb larger transactions without a price
impact because of their greater liquidity.3" New information about
asset value is, therefore, typically incorporated first in futures prices,
38. See, e.g., FRANKJ. FABozzi & FRANco MODIGIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS
AND INSTRUMENTS 12 (1992).
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and this is why futures markets are referred to as price-discovery
markets.
TABLE 2
ARBITRAGE RELATION OF FUTURES AND SPOT PRICES
Let:
S = spot price today = $40
r = interest rate = 1% per month
T = expiration of futures contract = 6 months
F = futures price today
S(T) = spot price at time T
By standard futures pricing for an asset that pays no dividends over T, such as gold:
F = S(1 + r)T = 40 x (1.01)6 - $42.46.
Suppose instead that F = $43. Then there is a riskless arbitrage strategy of borrowing $40
for six months at the interest rate r, buying the asset with the loan proceeds, and selling the
futures contract. Consider the cash flows of this portfolio:
ACTION CASH FLOW TODAY CASH FLOW AT TIME T
Borrow $40 +40 -40 x (1.06)6 = -42.46
Buy asset -40 S(T)
Sell futures 0 F - S(T) = 43 - S(T)
PORTFOLIO VALUE 0 $.54
With no cash investment, we have made a guaranteed profit of $.54, regardless of the spot
price at time T. The profit equals the mispricing of the futures contract, $43 - 42.46. This
is a riskless profit opportunity, referred to as cash-and-carry arbitrage (we buy the cash
good and carry it to the expiration of the futures contract).
If, for example, producers or storers of wheat observe that wheat
futures prices indicate wheat spot prices will increase relative to their
operating costs, they will produce and store more wheat, and conse-
quently improve the allocation for future consumption." Of course,
if the futures traders are misinformed (or manipulating the market)
such that the price in the future should not be higher than that pre-
dicted by current costs, then the price-discovery function of the fu-
tures market will have misfired and resources will be misallocated,
with more grain produced and stored than needed. Nevertheless,
where markets are thick a misinformation scenario is improbable.
The ease of closing out a position in a futures contract is one of
the principal benefits of transacting on an exchange. The benefit to
speculators has already been noted, but hedgers who use the underly-
ing product also benefit. In order to reduce the possibility that a
39. For a detailed discussion of the price-discovery function of futures markets using
this example, see HANS R. STOLL & ROBERT E. WHALEV, FUTURES AND OPTIONS 12-13 (1993).
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trader could manipulate futures prices by cornering the market for
the underlying commodity, futures contracts specify a range in the
quality of deliverable goods under the contract, with settlement prices
adjusted accordingly. Contracts also fix delivery locations. The shorts
who must make a delivery on a futures contract get to choose the qual-
ity of the goods and the delivery location. Therefore, longs prefer to
use spot market transactions to make the purchases they have hedged
through their futures positions. Buying in the spot market guarantees
that they will receive the specific product quality (or delivery location)
they desire. Hedgers therefore will close their futures position by off-
set just as speculators do. The net profit from the hedge is the same
as the gain the longs would have had if they had taken delivery on the
contract.
In some contracts, such as stock index futures and Eurodollar fu-
tures, there is only cash settlement, and no physical delivery is permit-
ted. At expiration, the value of the index or Eurodollar interest rate is
compared to the futures contract price and the gain or loss is paid. In
Eurodollar contracts, delivery is impossible because there is no deliv-
erable "asset" (the contract is on an interest rate). Although for stock
index futures contracts, one could physically deliver an index by deliv-
ering shares of all the stocks composing the index, physical delivery
would be cumbersome and expensive.40
B. The Futures Clearinghouse System
An important institutional difference between forward and fu-
tures markets, which enhances market liquidity and is related to fu-
tures contracts' standardization, is the clearinghouse system. Each
futures exchange establishes a clearinghouse that is interposed be-
tween the parties to a futures contract-the clearinghouse becomes
the seller to the purchaser of the futures contract and the purchaser
to the seller of the contract. The clearinghouse guarantees perform-
40. Physical delivery on stock index futures contracts is also prohibited by statute, as
part of the SEC-CFFC jurisdictional accord. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
The source for the prohibition was the SEC's concern that physical delivery could facilitate
manipulation of the stock market. This was a variant of its concern that futures trading
would adversely affect stock prices, a consideration that drove the SEC to oppose equity
futures contracts in the first place, and led to its jurisdictional battle with the CFrC and the
eventual accord. A recent financial product innovation, Standard & Poor's Depository Re-
ceipts (SPDRs), a stock index basket traded on the American Stock Exchange, would make
physical delivery on an index futures contract feasible. These are shares of a unit invest-
ment trust that holds the stocks in the S&P index. Trading SPDRs is intended to be
equivalent to trading the index. See Joseph S. Rizzello, The Development and Evolution of
Derivative Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS 1, 15 (Robert A.
Klein &Jess Lederman eds., 1994).
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ance of the futures contract. Its net position is always zero, because it
enters into both sides of each contract entered into by investors.
The clearinghouse is most typically an independent corporation,
whose stockholders are the member clearing firms and are also mem-
bers of the supporting exchange, although not all exchange members
are members of the clearinghouse. All trades on an exchange must
be cleared through a clearinghouse member. The clearing firms are
responsible for clearinghouse debts; that is, they provide the funds
behind the clearinghouse's guarantee. These firms must maintain
margin accounts with the clearinghouse, contribute separately to a re-
serve fund to cover clearinghouse obligations, and meet minimum fi-
nancial standards. While the clearinghouse monitors its members'
financial positions, the members keep track of positions of their cus-
tomers, the actual traders.
The result of this clearinghouse arrangement is that no investor
can be harmed by the failure of its contracting party to fulfill contract
terms financially upon the delivery date; the clearinghouse pays the
difference.41 An investor's failure to perform thus hurts the clearing-
house and not another investor. In a forward contract, there is no
such substitution of a clearinghouse for the contracting parties. Thus,
forward market participants are subject to far greater risk of nonper-
formance than are futures market participants. This feature has insti-
tutional ramifications. There is both an active forward and futures
market in foreign currencies, but the traders in the foreign currency
forward market are more creditworthy than traders in foreign cur-
rency futures: the forward market is comprised almost exclusively of
institutional, rather than individual, traders.
To protect themselves against contract defaults, clearinghouses
use a system of margin accounts and daily settlement. The clearing-
houses set contract margin requirements for their members and use
members' margin accounts to cover the obligations of a member's de-
faulting customer. If the member's assets are insufficient, the
clearinghouse's reserve fund, supplemented or replenished by special
assessments on all of its members, is used to cover the obligation. Ac-
cordingly, clearing firms impose margin requirements that are at least
as stringent as the clearinghouse's requirements on their customers,
41. The clearinghouse does not stand behind physical delivery contract performance.
Its role with respect to physical delivery is simply to handle the notification of investors'
intentions to deliver or take delivery. The most common method used by clearinghouses
to match a delivery request is to assign it to the member with the oldest opposite position
in the contract. The member uses a prearranged formula, disclosed to its customers in
advance, such as first-in-first-out, to allocate a delivery request.
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the actual buyers and sellers of the contracts, to cover their obliga-
tions to the clearinghouse. If a trader's broker is not a clearinghouse
member, there is an additional layer of accounts: the trader has a
margin account with his broker, who in turn has a margin account
with the clearing firm.
When two traders enter into a futures transaction, a margin ac-
count is created for each. The initial margin deposit (which is the
same for buyer and seller) typically ranges between one and twenty
percent of the value of the contract's underlying asset. The customer
may use Treasury securities to post margin, and the broker must pay
the securities' interest back to the customer. For such customers,
there is no opportunity cost to the futures margin account. Brokers
are not, however, required to pay interest on cash deposited in margin
accounts, even if the brokers earn interest on that cash. Margin ac-
counts are adjusted daily in response to changes in the value of posi-
tions, a process that is called "marking to market." If a customer's
position experiences a gain, his account balance is increased and he
may withdraw the profit from the account. If he experiences a loss,
his account balance is reduced. The effect of this daily revaluation of
margin accounts based on the daily settlement price of the futures
contract is to close out the contract daily and write a new one that is
priced at the market and thus has a zero value. The marking-to-mar-
ket practice is unique to futures markets.
If a margin account falls below a critical value called the mainte-
nance margin-which is the minimum amount per contract that a
customer must keep on deposit at all times and is typically set at sev-
enty-five percent of the initial margin-the account's owner must
transfer new funds into his account to bring the balance back up to
the initial margin level. These additional deposited funds are called
variation margin. If the customer fails to add the required amount,
the broker liquidates the account or closes out enough of the position
to meet the margin call. The same daily settlement system is applied
to clearinghouse member firms' margin accounts. Some clearing-
houses permit members to net across their customers' positions to de-
termine the margin amount, which substantially reduces the funds the
member must hold on margin compared to a gross account system.
The daily settlement system enhances market integrity (and the
clearinghouse's guarantee) because losses are covered incrementally
over time rather than all at the end of the contract, when an investor
could have accumulated a substantial loss that he cannot cover. Be-
cause positions will be closed out before huge losses can accumulate,
marking to market limits the risk of nonperformance. There are no
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margin accounts and daily settlement in forward markets and, not sur-
prisingly, forward market participants' creditworthiness is far greater
than those trading in comparable products on futures exchanges.
Margin amounts are related to the volatility of price changes in
underlying assets: contracts on more volatile assets have higher mar-
gins. The logic of the margin formula is that the initial margin
amount should cover all likely daily changes in the value of a contract,
thereby ensuring that, under daily marking to market, all of a cus-
tomer's probable losses will be covered. This is intended to protect
the broker against liability to the clearinghouse, and the clearing-
house from liability to other investors arising out of a customer de-
fault. Market participants contend that this use of margin-good
faith money put up to protect against default-differs importantly
from the use of margins in securities transactions. The margin ac-
count in a security transaction is a down payment for a loan from the
broker for the purchase of a security. Therefore, stock investors do
not put up Treasury securities and receive interest on margin ac-
counts; instead, they often pay interest to their brokers.
Given this difference in function, it is not surprising that the mar-
gin requirements for stocks and stock index futures are dramatically
different (fifty percent versus ten to fifteen percent respectively). Se-
curities regulators see things differently and argue that margins
should be mandated by the government at the same level for both
stocks and stock index futures.42 But their position makes little sense.
Even if one were skeptical of participants' claims that the margin func-
tion differs, because in both cases margin accounts guarantee per-
formance (delivery on a futures contract or repayment of a loan to
purchase stock), it is clear that the stock index futures margin should
be significantly less than the stocks' margin because an index is much
less volatile than an individual stock. For example, the historical stan-
dard deviation of the returns on the S&P 500 (Standard & Poor's com-
42. The SEC advocated raising futures margins, as did the Treasury Department, dur-
ing the Bush Administration. See Issues Related to the Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Foresty, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990) (statement of
Robert R. Glauber, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Finance); id. at 52 (statement of
Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n). After a lengthy
political fight that delayed the CFTC's reauthorization from 1990 to 1992, the conflict was
resolved by giving the Federal Reserve Board, which sets the margin for securities, over-
sight authority over stock index futures margins in the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 501, 106 Stat. 3590, 3628-29 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1994)).
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posite index) is 20.8% whereas the average historical standard
deviation of individual stocks is close to 50%. 4 3
As a result of the daily marking to market of futures contracts, the
contract's delivery date does not govern the realization of profits or
losses-they are realized over the life of the contract. Accordingly,
there is a cash flow timing difference for futures contracts compared
to forward contracts. While the overall gain or loss on equivalent for-
ward and futures contracts is the same, holders of futures contracts
recognize gains and losses immediately because of the daily settlement
process and they are thereby affected by interest rate movements as
gains are reinvested or losses financed. Empirical studies indicate,
however, that the difference in futures and forward prices due to this
differential timing factor is trivial.' 4
The clearinghouse system makes it easier for futures traders to
close their positions than it is for parties to forward contracts. To
undo a position, a futures investor instructs his broker to enter into a
transaction on the other side of the contract, reversing the original
position. For example, if the investor is long, he instructs his broker
to sell a contract. Upon the reversing transaction, the investor nets
out to zero, since he holds both a long and a short position in the
same contract, which cancel each other out. This is a convenient
method of closing out a position, because it involves only bookkeep-
ing (closing out the account with the clearinghouse), rather than ne-
gotiating with the party to the original contract to terminate or assign
the contract, as must be done in the forward market.
The function of a clearinghouse in futures markets differs from
that of clearing associations in securities markets. Although in both
markets clearing institutions perform a banking function by facilitat-
ing the transfer of funds between contracting parties and their agents,
clearing associations in securities markets do not become parties to
transactions, act as guarantors of contracts, or facilitate settlement by
delivery. The different function of futures clearinghouses is necessi-
tated by the difference in the market transactions involved. The ful-
fillment of futures contracts requires a trader's future performance,
which cannot be guaranteed by the trader as readily as the immediate
performance that occurs in a stock purchase or sale (stock transac-
tions must be finalized and cleared in three days). Stock traders bear
the risk of counterparty default, given the lack of a clearinghouse
43. STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 262 (3d ed. 1993).
44. For a summary of these studies, see JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER
DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 57 (2d ed. 1993).
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guarantee, but that risk is small because it is limited to a few business
days.
To date, the clearinghouse system has been successful in its guar-
antee function. There has been no futures clearinghouse default.
Nevertheless, because individual traders trade through brokers, they
are actually subject to the credit risk of their broker. Traders cannot
be harmed by the other side's failure to perform on a futures contract
because the clearinghouse covers such defaults. They could, however,
lose the value in their margin accounts if their broker goes bankrupt
(the clearinghouse does not stand behind the broker). The customer
account segregation rules are supposed to mitigate this possibility,45
but they are not always successful.'
C. Regulatory Regime
1. Creation of the CFTC.-The exchange-traded property of fu-
tures contracts is the key divide for regulatory purposes between types
of derivative securities. An independent federal agency, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), regulates futures con-
tracts, which must be sold on exchanges. It does not regulate non-
45. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1994); see also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
46. The most serious incident involving a futures exchange clearinghouse illustrates
the risks that brokers' financial difficulties pose to their customers. In March 1985 three
customers of Volume Investors, a clearing member of the Commodity Exchange
(COMEX), failed to meet a $26 million margin call on short positions in gold options. See
Michael A. Hiltzik, Comex Still Unraveling a Big Debace; One Group's Default Proves Vulnerability
of Unwary Traders, LA TIMES, May 20, 1985, pt. 4, at 1. As Hiltzik recounts, because Vol-
ume Investors had only approximately $4 million in capital, it was unable to meet the
margin call and it failed. All of its customer accounts were frozen while it was suspended
from trading and put into receivership. After seizing the margin deposits along with Vol-
ume's other assets, the COMEX Clearing Association (CCA) liquidated all of the customer
accounts to cover Volume's default. This not only infuriated Volume's customers, as the
liquidation was done at fire-sale prices, but shocked futures markets generally, as traders
thought they were protected by the segregation rules and would not be harmed by other
customers' defaults. Traders' expectations concerning the safety of individual accounts
were informed by the practice that had been followed by other exchanges upon broker
insolvencies, which avoided such losses.
Volume's nondefaulting customers eventually did recover the account balance that
remained after their holdings had been liquidated. Laurie Cohen, COMEX to Help Pay
Firm's Debts, CHI. Tma., Dec. 10, 1985, (Business), at 3. Although the CCA was not techni-
cally responsible for the funds, it agreed to replace them because of reputational concerns
and apparentiy considerable industry pressure. Id. The amounts paid, however, did not
cover losses in account value experienced upon CCA's liquidation of the accounts. Two
years later, in response to Volume Investors' failure, the cFrC changed financial early-
warning system rules to require clearing members to notify the exchange, as well as the
agency, immediately if the amount owed in an undermargined customer account is greater
than the firm's capital. CFTC Shores Up Financial Rules Applicable to FCMS, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1140 (July 31, 1987).
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exchange-traded contracts, that is, forward contracts. Federal regula-
tion of futures began in 1922, and until 1974, the futures regulator
was an entity within the Department of Agriculture, reflecting the fu-
tures markets' origins in contracts on agricultural commodities.47
The move to form an independent agency in 1974 ostensibly de-
rived from the desire to expand regulatory coverage to then-unregu-
lated futures trading, which included several contracts on
nonagricultural products, such as silver and foreign currency futures,
as well as internationally grown agricultural products like coffee and
sugar. Proponents of an independent agency maintained that regula-
tion of the new nonagricultural contracts would require expertise be-
yond the Agriculture Department's capacity. The fact that the CBOT
was contemplating marketing futures on Government National Mort-
gage Association certificates was cited as further reason to create an
independent agency.4"
But the concern over expertise appears to have been only a pe-
ripheral reason for an independent agency because no one, not even
independent agency proponents, foresaw the dramatic shift in the
market away from a predominance of agricultural products that oc-
curred in the following years. The principal criticism of the regula-
tory structure that led to the formation of the CFTC was the inherent
conflict of interest in assigning market regulation to the Department
of Agriculture, an organization that had a duty under other legislation
to protect farmers' income. It was argued that the Department of Ag-
riculture could not be trusted to be neutral regarding futures prices.
At the time, there had been a steep increase in food prices and some
newspaper reporters alleged that speculators' trading was the cause,
47. The original entity was the Grain Futures Administration, established in 1922 by
the Secretary of Agriculture to implement the initial federal legislation regulating futures,
the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). This bureau became a separate entity
with the enactment of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491, called
the Commodities Exchange Commission, which consisted of the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, with the Secretary of Agriculture
exercising day-to-day regulatory authority. The Agriculture Secretary immediately created
an agency within his department, the Commodity Exchange Administration, later renamed
the Commodity Exchange Authority, to carry out his functions. This entity replaced the
Grain Futures Administration and regulated futures until the establishment of the CFTC in
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Star. 1389
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (1994)).
48. See HOUSE COMM. ON AGiucULTURE, COMMODIIY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ACT
OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974). In his opening statement at the
Senate hearings on the legislation, Senator McGovern raised all of the reasons discussed in
the text for the establishment of an independent agency. Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
195-98 (1974) (statement of Sen. McGovern).
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although the Agriculture Department testified that such claims were
incorrect.4' A more plausible, albeit unstated, reason for the proposal
was the Democratic Congress's desire for greater control over regula-
tory policy, given its dissatisfaction with the Nixon Administration's
agricultural policy, which sought to reduce farm subsidy programs, as
well as its general deregulatory philosophy.
2. CFTCJurisdiction.--The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) fur-
nishes the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts on
all commodities.5" It defines a commodity, in addition to a list of spe-
cifically enumerated agricultural products, as "all other goods and ar-
ticles ... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."51 The agency's
regulatory authority derives from the statute's prohibition of futures
trading unless conducted on an agency-authorized contract market or
exchange (called a "board of trade"). 52 Futures contracts must there-
fore be approved by the CFTC before they can be traded, and ex-
changes proposing a contract must comply with CFTC regulations to
be authorized as boards of trade. Approvals for trading are done on a
contract-by-contract basis, as each generic contract constitutes a sepa-
rate contract market.
For a contract to be designated a contract market, the CFTC must
find that the contract is "not... contrary to the public interest,"' and
the offering exchange must demonstrate that it provides a mechanism
for prevention of manipulation of contract prices.54 Although one
can engage in an esoteric discussion over the meaning of the statutory
standard for approval, given the confusing legislative history involving
the removal of language in the original bill requiring an economic
purpose test,55 the bottom line is that a contract that has no commer-
cial use (that is, no risk-management or price-discovery function) will
not be profitable for an exchange to trade. Speculators tend not to
provide the constant and sufficient base of market demand that busi-
ness users (hedgers) do. Basil Yamey has succinctly summarized the
49. Commodity Futures Trading ommission Act of 1974: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1974) (statement of Clayton Yeutter, Assistant Secretary
for Marketing and Consumer Services, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture).
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-2a (1994).
51. 7 U.S.C. § la.
52. 7 U.S.C. § 6.
53. 7 U.S.C. § 7(7).
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2a(ii)(II), 7(4).
55. See I PHILUP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 2.07, at
263-64 (2d ed. 1989).
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empirical evidence supporting this claim as follows: (1) the volume of
trading is positively related to the volume of hedging; (2) the decline
of a commodity market is accompanied by the "decline and demise"
of the futures market (e.g., frozen eggs); (3) the decline in short-
hedging in "backwardation" markets (markets where the futures price
is less than the spot price) because of its high cost given the price
relation, is paralleled by a decline in nonhedging trading and the
thinning of formerly active trading markets; (4) futures contracts be-
yond eighteen to twenty-four months are rare and the contracts with
the longest maturity (which are contracts with limited hedging inter-
est because users of the commodity "are rarely likely to consider trans-
actions in actuals that commit them more than a year ahead") are very
thinly traded.56
A fundamental issue created by this regulatory set-up involves the
legal definition of a futures contract, for it provides the linchpin for
CFTC jurisdiction. Although futures and forward contracts are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from an economic perspective, forward con-
tracts are excluded from the CFTC's regulation, and thus are
permitted to trade in unregulated forums. As a result, a significant
amount of litigation over whether products are futures contracts arises
as parties seek either to avoid or come under the CFTC's regulatory
regime. Two different CEA provisions are the source of the exclusion
and are at the heart of the litigation.
Forward contracts were exempted from federal regulation when
futures first came under federal control in 1922, in a provision re-
ferred to as the "deferred delivery" or forward contract exception, in
order to prevent farmers' cash-deferred transactions (forward crop
sales) from being subject to regulation.57 There are two typical
56. Basil S. Yamey, Scope for Futures Trading and Conditions for Success, in How CoMMoD-
nry Fumarus MARKETs WoRK 14, 20-22 (1985).
57. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(ll)
(1994)). The first federal statute regulating futures was enacted in the wake of declining
crop prices in the severe agricultural depression during 1920 and 1921 after European
agricultural production recommenced with the end of World War I. Futures markets re-
opened as government price controls were lifted with the end of the war and the politically
organized farmers held the "speculators" on futures markets responsible for the post-war
decline in agricultural prices. See, e.g., Future Trading: Hearings Before House Comm. on Agri-
culture, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 17 (1921) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of C.H. Hyde,
Farmers Union of Oklahoma). The deferred delivery exception protected farmers from
having to contract on exchanges when they agreed to sell their crops for future delivery.
Although the exchanges opposed regulation, they ultimately accepted the registration sys-
tem because the exchange trading requirement actually protected their business by
prohibiting the off-exchange trading occurring in bucket shops. Bucket shops were in the
business of taking bets on commodity prices. They did not place and execute contract
orders for the underlying assets as did the exchanges. Instead, using the exchanges' price
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sources of litigation over whether a particular product is a futures or a
forward contract. Either the CFTC seeks to enforce its authority and
prevent a contract from trading by asserting that off-exchange-traded
instruments are illegal futures contracts (not duly registered and
traded on a recognized exchange), or private parties with contract
losses attempt to avoid payment by contending that the contract is
unenforceable as an illegal futures contract.
Because there are no statutory definitions of either a futures or
forward contract, the institutional features differentiating forward and
futures markets (such as marking to market and cash settlement) have
become the operational legal distinctions employed in determining
the applicable regulatory regime. The four classic elements of a fu-
tures contract identified by the CFTC, and followed by courts, are (1)
a standardized contract, (2) offered to the general public, (3) secured
by earnest money or margin, and (4) entered into primarily for the
purpose of shifting price risk and not for transferring ownership of
actual commodities (that is, the contract is settled by offset rather
than by taking physical delivery of the underlying asset).58 Most cases
turn on the fourth factor, whether physical delivery of the goods ordi-
narily occurs under the contracts. But the second factor, whether the
traders are members of the general public, also can be decisive.
For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co Petro
Marketing Group,59 the court upheld the CFTC's finding that a gasoline
broker's "agency agreements" with customers for the purchase and
sale of motor vehicle fuel were illegal (non-exchange-traded) futures
contracts by applying the CFTC's four-factor test.6" The contracts
were marketed to members of the general public, who never took de-
livery. While the terms were not standardized, the broker always offset
the contracts for its customers, a feature that the court considered the
functional equivalent of standardization, for it viewed the essential
quotations, they simply paid off customers whose bets won and took money from those
whose bets lost. When winning bets were numerous, the bucket shops would disappear or
file for bankruptcy. They were the object of state regulatory efforts, with the exchanges
often at the forefront, to prohibit gambling. For an interesting discussion of the ex-
changes' efforts to distinguish legitimate commercial speculation from gambling, by redi-
recting press attacks on "gambling" speculators on exchanges into attacks on "counterfeit"
speculators in bucket shops, see ANN FABIAN, CARM SHARxs, DREAM BooKs AND BUCKET
SHOPS 188-200 (1990).
58. In re Stovall, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,941 (Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n 1979).
59. 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 581.
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function of standardized contracting as the facilitation of contract ter-
mination by offset.61
In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum, a decline
in the market value of oil led the plaintiff to refuse to take delivery on
a contract for the future purchase of oil and to sue the defendant for
violating various provisions of the CEA and other statutes.6" The de-
fendant maintained that the CEA did not apply because the contracts
were forward contracts. The court held that the off-exchange con-
tracts, which called for fifteen-day delivery of Brent crude oil (North
Sea oil), were futures contracts, and hence the CEA applied.63 The
court's decision relied upon the fact that most of the trades were for
hedging purposes and not for actual delivery of the oil. Although
there was no contractual "right" for a party to offset its contract and
avoid delivery, the market practice was for the parties to agree to cash
settlement.
The Brent oil contract market was an institutional market used
largely by oil producers. The court's holding that the contracts were
futures severely disrupted the market, creating undesirable uncer-
tainty for the oil companies using these contracts, for it meant they
would have to comply with CFTC rules and regulations that did not fit
with their market. The CFTC responded by overturning the court's
decision through the issuance of a statutory interpretation that de-
clared the Brent oil contracts forward and not futures contracts. 64
The agency emphasized that the contracts were privately negotiated
among commercial enterprises in the oil business and included the
risk that a purchaser would be required to take delivery (that is, a
party did not have to agree to offset its contract).65
The CFTC's seemingly contradictory positions in these two repre-
sentative forward contract exemption cases are easily reconciled. The
CFTC is most concerned with exerting authority over contracts that
are marketed to unsophisticated members of the public-investors
who are thought to be in greatest need of the protection offered by
the CEA, such as the clientele of Co Petro-as opposed to markets
61. Id. at 576.
62. 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63. Id. at 1493.
64. CFTC Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg.
39,188 (1990). Under its authority to exempt classes of products from regulation without
having to find whether they are forward and not futures contracts, which was created by
the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629-
32, the CFTC further exempted Brent oil contracts from its regulation. CFTC Exemption
for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286 (1993).
65. 58 Fed. Reg. 21,287-88 (1993).
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composed of commercial and institutional traders, such as the Brent
oil market. This agency attitude toward institutional markets may,
however, change. In the wake of institutional investors' substantial
losses in the unregulated off-exchange derivative market, the then
CFTC chairman indicated that in her judgment even sophisticated in-
stitutional investors needed to be protected.'
The 1974 legislation creating the CFTC included a second ex-
emptive provision, the so-called Treasury amendment, which removed
from the CFTC's jurisdiction the extensive foreign exchange forward
market, as well as additional financial instruments traded in the in-
terbank market, such as mortgage purchase commitments, warrants,
and government securities.6 7 The Treasury Department, which regu-
lates the banks that conduct this market, insisted upon the provision
to ensure that banks' activities would not be disrupted by CFTC inter-
ference. Because the banks that make the market are themselves reg-
ulated by federal agencies, the exception was not expected to create a
regulatory void.' a To prevent off-exchange currency transactions by
individual traders, the CFTC has asserted that the Treasury amend-
ment solely exempts interbank transactions.69 Not all courts have
agreed, however, with the CFTC's interpretation." Because the ex-
emption expressly applies only to off-exchange transactions, ex-
change-traded currency futures are regulated by the CFTC. These
66. Schapiro Rejects Idea That Protection Not Needed for 'Sophisticated Investors, 26 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) at 1523-24 (Nov. 11, 1994).
67. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
68. As the Senate report on the legislation indicated, the banks that made up most of
this market were "more properly supervised" by the banking regulatory agencies than the
new CFTC. COMMODITY Furums TRADING COMMISSION Acr OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1131, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974).
69. CFTC, Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983
(1985).
70. Because the statutory language refers to the type of product, not the type of trader,
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994), some courts have disagreed with the agency's position
that only interbank transactions are exempted. In Salomon Forex v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966
(4th Cir. 1993), cert. denie 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994), for example, a commodities firm sued
an individual customer who had not paid a $26 million trading loss. The customer was a
wealthy surgeon who traded extensively in currencies and who was the only individual (as
opposed to institutional) trader with whom the firm conducted business. The court held
that the individually negotiated sales of foreign currency futures were within the exemp-
tion as off-exchange instruments, and thus did not relieve the individual of liability for his
losses. Id. at 977. In CFTC v. Standard Forex, Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 26,063, at
41,446 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), however, the court adopted the CF'C's view of the statute's scope.
Id. at 41,455. It granted the CFTC's request to enjoin the defendant's marketing of con-
tracts to buy and sell British pounds to members of the public, finding a congressional
purpose to exempt only the interbank market because those financial institutions were
already regulated. Id. at 41,454.
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products were developed by the exchanges for individuals who wanted
to trade in currencies but, lacking the financial wherewithal for banks
to be willing to trade with them, did not have access to the off-ex-
change interbank market. While the cases under the Treasury amend-
ment have involved traditional products specified in the statute, such
as currency futures and options, major financial innovations offered
by banks, such as swap contracts, seemingly covered by the exemption,
have been the subject of substantial regulatory controversy. 71
3. Authority of the CFTC.-Once a contract has been shown to be
a futures contract and a contract market has been designated, a pano-
ply of other regulations involving the contract's marketing and trad-
ing comes into effect.72 Brokerage firms that sell futures contracts,
referred to as futures commission merchants (FCMs), must register
with the CFTC and comply with minimum capital, reporting, and re-
cordkeeping requirements, and segregate customers' funds and secur-
ities from their own and other customers' accounts. Other market
professionals, such as introducing brokers (sales personnel who solicit
or accept trade orders but do not maintain customer accounts), floor
brokers (individuals or firms who execute orders on exchange trading
floors), commodity trading advisors (persons in the business of ren-
dering advice about commodities), and commodity pool operators
(the futures analogy to a mutual fund), must also register with the
agency.
The regulatory regime includes a strong self-regulatory compo-
nent, typical of the federal regulation of financial markets. Much of
the CFTC's registration responsibilities are delegated to a statutorily
recognized private organization of market professionals, the National
Futures Association (NFA), and the futures exchanges are statutorily
responsible for initiating and enforcing rules regulating participant
conduct and ensuring compliance with CEA provisions. In addition,
the CFTC requires exchanges to set speculative position limits (in
cases in which it has not set such a limit itself), restricting the number
of contracts that can be held at any point in time by a trader not en-
gaging in "bona fide hedging" transactions.
The futures regulatory regime seeks to maintain market integrity
by ensuring that futures markets are competitive, as well as by directly
regulating the key participants. Numerous statutory provisions seek to
establish the competitive execution of futures trades. For example,
71. See infra text accompanying notes 151-160.
72. The Commodity Exchange Act is codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994). Details on all
the provisions mentioned in the text can be found in 1-3 JOHNSoN & HAZEN, supra note 55.
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wash sales (transactions that give the appearance of a purchase or sale
but that avoid any change in ownership), fictitious trades, and non-
competitive trading (such as filling one order by offsetting it against
another customer's order without the customer's consent, or taking
the other side of a customer's trade without his prior consent) are
prohibited.7" The purpose of such prohibitions is to ensure that fu-
tures market prices are competitively set, and hence not distorted.
The underlying assumption is that centralized open-outcry exchange
markets, where transaction prices are immediately and publicly ob-
served, best ensure a competitive marketplace.
Another component of the regulatory regime's defense of market
integrity is the prevention of market manipulation."4 As with protec-
tion of competitive futures market pricing, market manipulation was a
critical concern to the legislators establishing the regulatory regime,
legislators whose constituents were farmers and others dealing in the
underlying commodities on which futures contracts were written, be-
cause of the close connection between futures and spot market prices.
Manipulation, a term generally used to refer to activity to make mar-
ket prices artificial, is not, however, defined in the statute.75 The ab-
sence of a statutory definition is said to be due to concern that
providing a definition might exclude some conduct that the CFTC
would wish to prohibit.76 Of course, from the trader's perspective, the
lack of a definition renders it difficult to determine whether particular
conduct is illegal.
Manipulation is related to, and interchanged with, notions of a
market "comer" (control or domination of the available supply of a
cash commodity) or a market "squeeze" (control or domination of a
futures market under market conditions in which cash supplies are
insufficient to meet the futures contracts' delivery demand), which
create artificially high prices and are more readily defined. The idea
of manipulation in a futures market is based on the following scena-
rio. If the holder of a large number of long positions in a futures
contract that is about to expire also holds a large proportion of the
contract's deliverable supply, he could impose substantial losses on
the shorts by insisting on taking delivery on his contracts and then
charging very high ("artificial") prices in the cash market as the shorts
73. 7 U.S.C. § 6c.
74. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2a(ii) (II), 7(4).
75. Manipulation is likewise prohibited, but not defined, in the securities laws. 1
THOMAS A. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FuTuRES AND OPTIONS MARKETS ch.
12, at 12-13 (May 1993).
76. Id. at 12-13 to -14.
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attempt to cover their contracts. The difficulty with this concept is
that activities claimed to be manipulation often cannot be distin-
guished from legitimate market behavior. As a consequence, in the
case law, manipulation devolves into mind-numbing efforts at deter-
mining traders' specific intentions to manipulate and establishing that
the market price was artificial."
The CFTC has numerous enforcement powers at its disposal to
prevent market manipulation, in addition to its power to review con-
tracts for trading designation.78 For example, it possesses the author-
ity to issue cease-and-desist orders and civil penalties against
individual manipulators and exchanges for not preventing manipula-
tion,7 9 to bring injunctive actions in federal court,"° and to issue emer-
gency orders to exchanges to prevent actual or threatened
manipulation." Manipulation is also made a felony punishable by
fine or imprisonment.82
Market manipulation by a downward manipulation of price (ac-
cumulating large short and spot market positions and insisting on
making delivery) is extremely rare, with few reported cases, and it is
theoretically difficult to understand how such a manipulation could
be successfully undertaken." Substantial capital would be required to
finance the cash market purchases necessary to succeed in a down-
ward market manipulation. This is in contrast to an upward price ma-
nipulation scheme, which requires no such capital as the requisite
cash market conditions-commodity shortages-often occur natu-
rally, such as after a natural disaster. In addition, as Pirrong et al.
point out, given the symmetry of opposing trading positions, "the con-
ditions that make long manipulation profitable-rapidly increasing
costs of making delivery combined with relatively constant marginal
costs of taking delivery--make short manipulation unprofitable."84
Because the conditions favorable for long manipulation are more
likely to recur than those favorable for short manipulation, "only one
form of manipulation [long manipulation] should predominate." 85
77. Compare In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n 1982) (not finding manipulation) with Car-
gill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding manipulation).
78. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
79. 7 U.S.C. § 13b (1994).
80. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1.
81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 12a(9).
82. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)(2), 13b.
83. See 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 55, § 5.06, at 12-13.
84. S. CRAIG PIRRONG ET AL., GRAIN FuTuREs CoNTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 76
(1993).
85. Id.
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Since upward price manipulation is the more realistic scenario, and
the shorts are typically commercial hedgers (in particular, farmers,
who are a key political constituency in the regulation of futures mar-
kets and take short positions when they enter the market to hedge), it
is not surprising that market manipulation, namely, protection of
shorts, is a key regulatory foCUS.8 6
The depth of the markets underlying financial futures has gener-
ally made market manipulation less of a concern than in agricultural
markets because cornering would be extremely expensive, if not im-
possible.87 Moreover, to reduce the risk of manipulation, as is the
case with agricultural futures, financial futures fixed income contracts
typically can be satisfied by the delivery of more than one issue in the
appropriate maturity range, making it more difficult to comer the
market. Some contracts eliminate the matter entirely as they are cash-
settled only (stock index and Eurodollar futures).
It should be noted that there is a key trade-off in contract design
concerning delivery terms. The more flexible the delivery terms, the
less manipulable the contract (a squeeze or comer is less likely be-
cause more varieties of the commodity are available for the shorts to
fulfill their obligations). But the more flexibility in delivery, the less
valuable the contract is for commercial users. Variety in deliverable
product makes the commodity underlying the contract less homoge-
neous, which reduces the effectiveness of hedging because the rela-
tion between futures and spot prices is less precise. It also makes
exercise undesirable as a means of obtaining the commodity because
the long cannot control the quality of the good received.
D. Uses of Futures Contracts
The principal business use of futures contracts is precisely the
same as that of forward contracts, management of price risk. Buyers
of futures contracts seek to guarantee the price they will pay in the
future for commodities needed for their business at a later date, and
86. Of course, farmers can benefit on the cash side from upward manipulation. In
fact, as the prime movers in the federal regulation of futures markets, their concern, his-
torically, was alleged downward manipulation of prices and not upward price manipula-
tion. See generally Hearings, supra note 57. In the 1920s, few farmers hedged using futures.
Id.
87. Salomon Brothers allegedly succeeded in manipulating a Treasury bond market by
entering more bids than permitted under Treasury auction rules, thereby squeezing short
investors in the cash market. Kahn v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 191, 191 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (summarizing complaint alleging actions artificially raising price of May 1991 Treas-
ury bonds). This would not have created a squeeze potential in the bond futures market
because no one bond issue is the sole deliverable bond on a contract.
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sellers of such contracts seek to guarantee the price they will receive
when they sell commodities produced by their business in the fu-
ture.88 While it is possible that both sides to a futures contract are
hedgers (for example, a farmer sells a wheat contract to a miller),
usually hedgers are shifting risk to investors who buy and sell futures
in order to speculate about future price levels of the commodity un-
derlying the futures contract. Speculators are willing to assume price
risk in exchange for the possibility of making profits.
Speculators could also place their bets on price movements by
purchasing or selling the underlying assets, but they can make bigger
profits in derivative markets. Trading costs are lower, and derivatives
offer the benefit of leverage-much less money has to be put down up
front to assume a position. For as previously noted, the futures mar-
gin amount is only a small percentage of the value of the underlying
asset. In addition, futures markets provide the most convenient
method of speculating on price movements because of their unique
offsetting feature, which eliminates the possibility of investors having
to take possession of a physical commodity at contract expiration. In
the public imagination, speculator is a decidedly pejorative term. But
the speculator's function in futures markets is absolutely essential. If
speculators did not transact in futures markets, businesses could not
manage price risks as efficiently. The consequent higher cost of risk
would make society worse off, as that cost would be transmitted into
higher product prices.
Just as are agricultural commodity futures, financial futures are
used to manage price risk. Treasury bond and note futures contracts
can be used to hedge the price risk in positions in underlying govern-
ment securities, as well as in other fixed-income securities, such as
corporate bonds or mortgage-backed securities (the risk from chang-
ing interest rates, also termed interest rate risk). Stock index futures
contracts can be used to hedge the risk of changes in the value of a
88. Because the asset hedged may not be identical to the asset underlying the futures
contract, futures hedgers replace price risk with what is referred to as basis risk. The basis
is defined as the difference between the spot price of the asset being hedged and the
futures price of the contract used for the hedge, and it equals the cost of carry. See supra p.
14. This difference may change over the life of the hedge because the spot and futures
prices may change by unequal amounts, and be positive or negative when the hedge ends.
If the hedged asset is the same as the asset underlying the futures contract, then the basis is
zero at the contract's expiration because arbitrage forces the two prices to converge. The
closer the correlation of changes in the price of the asset to be hedged and the changes in
the price of the futures contract, the lower the basis risk. The change in the basis is, in any
event, less variable than the change in an asset's price, and therefore, a hedged position is
less risky than an unhedged one. For a more technical discussion of the basis and hedging,
see CHANCE, supra note 21, at 354-59.
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stock portfolio.8 9 Finally, swap dealers use financial futures to hedge
the residual risk of their swap portfolio that arises from holding non-
matched swaps. 90
One common hedging use of financial futures entails establish-
ing a futures position as a temporary substitute for transactions to be
made in the cash market at a later date. This type of transaction is
called an anticipatory hedge. Consider a pension fund manager, for
example, who knows that in two months he will receive a cash inflow
(the employer's periodic contribution) that is to be invested in fixed-
income securities. This fund manager might be concerned that the
price of Treasury bonds will be higher in two months than they are
today (a change resulting from declining interest rates). The fund
manager does not have the cash to purchase the bonds today, but he
can hedge the risk of higher prices and lock in the current price by
taking a long Treasury bond futures position, which sets the bonds'
purchase price at the current futures price.
The opposite strategy applies to the pension fund manager who
knows that, in two months, the fund's beneficiaries must be paid a
specified amount, which will necessitate liquidating a portion of the
fund's portfolio at that time. If the value of the bonds the manager
intends to sell declines over the next two months, then he will have to
sell more bonds to obtain the cash needed for the fund payouts. The
manager can reduce this price risk and lock in the price of the bonds
that will be liquidated today by selling Treasury bond futures.
Financial futures have additional uses beyond eliminating or
hedging exposure due to changes in interest rates or stock prices. In-
vestment managers may use futures as a cheaper means of achieving
portfolio goals, such as maintaining particular asset allocations or
portfolio risk levels. For example, stock index futures can be used as a
substitute for holding an index portfolio of stocks, and fixed-income
futures can be used as a substitute for holding fixed-income securities.
To illustrate, suppose a pension fund manager wants to shift the
fund's current allocation between bonds and stocks by $100 million.
The manager could sell $100 million of stocks and buy $100 million of
bonds with the proceeds, incurring transaction costs of commissions
and bid-ask spreads, and potentially bearing market-impact costs (the
89. A dynamic form of hedging with stock index futures to replicate a protective put
option strategy, see infra part Ill.C, known as portfolio insurance, was popular with institu-
tional investors until the 1987 stock market crash, when the strategy proved ineffective
because the fast-moving, one-sided selling demand during the crash prevented hedge ad-
justment. See HuLL, supra note 44, at 318-21.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 123-128.
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adverse effect on price that a large trade may have). An alternative
approach to achieving the desired allocation is to buy an appropriate
number of interest rate futures and sell an appropriate number of
stock index futures. This saves transaction costs because commissions
and spreads for futures trading are lower than those for stock and
bonds. For example, an institutional investor incurs a round-trip trad-
ing cost on a stock index futures contract of about $25, or less than
.1% of the value of the contract, whereas the round-trip commission
incurred on the underlying stock portfolio is much higher, approxi-
mately 1 % of the portfolio's value,9" Using futures to reconfigure a
portfolio also reduces market-impact costs because they are thicker
markets. Futures positions are then slowly liquidated as cash positions
are actually shifted. This can be done incrementally to ensure that
the reconfiguration in the cash market will have no market impact.
Stock index futures can also be used to adjust a stock portfolio's
beta (the sensitivity of changes in a portfolio's return to changes in
the return on the market) to any desired level. Adjusting a portfolio's
beta is a technique used by active fund managers to engage in "market
timing" trading strategies, strategies that seek to profit by trades that
anticipate market movements; that is, the manager "times" the mar-
ket's moves by selling before the market drops, or buying before it
rises. If the manager anticipates a rise in the market, he increases the
portfolio's beta. This provides him with additional gains because
higher beta stocks go up more than the market. If the manager thinks
the market is going to fall, he decreases the portfolio's beta to reduce
the portfolio's decline, because low beta stocks move less than the
market moves.92 Putting aside the question whether market timing is
91. Morgan Stanley estimates that transaction costs in the stock index futures market
are between 5 and 10% of those in the stock market. FABozzi & MODIGLIAN1, supra note 38,
at 321.
92. A simple example will clarify the use of futures to adjust a portfolio's beta. Suppose
a manager holds a $10 million stock portfolio that has a beta of 1.2. The manager expects
the market to decline steeply next month. If this occurs, the portfolio's loss will be greater
than the market's decline because its beta is greater than 1 (by definition the market's
beta). A portfolio beta of 1.2 means that the portfolio is 120% as volatile as the market.
Therefore, the manager will want to reduce the portfolio's market exposure prior to the
predicted market decline. Assume that the manager's target beta is .1, a level at which the
portfolio's value will drop only by 10% as much as the market drops. By selling stock index
futures contracts while holding on to the current stock portfolio, the manager can achieve
this objective for his overall portfolio. Because the beta of a portfolio is the weighted sum
of the betas of its component parts, the manager must solve the following problem: find
the number of futures contracts that, when combined with the current stock portfolio,
yields the desired portfolio, $10 million in stock with a beta of.1. Assuming that the S&P
500 futures' current price is 545, the contract value is $500 times the price, or $500 x 545 =
$272,500. Hence, the equation the manager must solve is: $10 million x .1 (desired port-
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an effective strategy,9" it is cheaper to adjust a portfolio's beta by trad-
ing in stock index futures contracts than in actual stocks.9 4
Another reason for adjusting a portfolio's beta is to eliminate
market risk in order to bear idiosyncratic risk or to lock in existing
portfolio gains. For example, if a money manager has private infor-
mation that a particular stock is going to rise in value, or if he has
accumulated a significant gain on a specific stock portfolio, then if the
stock market declines, this would moderate or eliminate the potential
gain on the stock portfolio in the former case and the realized gain in
the latter case. By taking a short position in stock index futures, the
manager eliminates the market risk of his portfolio, and thus is ex-
posed solely to his portfolio stock's idiosyncratic risk.
E. Corporate Hedging
Several of the examples of the use of forward and futures con-
tracts to manage risk have referred to corporate hedgers. It is not self-
evident that strategies that make sense for individuals, such as a risk-
averse farmer, make sense for public corporations, whose sharehold-
ers are likely to hold diversified stock portfolios and therefore cannot
be described accurately as risk averse. This contention is a variant of
Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theorem, which states that under
specified assumptions (such as no transaction costs or taxes), a firm
folio) = $10 million x 1.2 + Nf x $272,500 x 1 (portfolio combining current stock portfolio
and futures contracts), where Nf is the number of futures contracts needed for the strategy.
The stock index futures have a beta of 1 because their value is derived from the underlying
stocks that essentially constitute the market. Solving for Nf, we obtain -40.37 contracts.
Rounding to the nearest integer, the manager sells 40 S&P 500 futures contracts, which in
combination with his existing $10 million of stock, results in a portfolio with a beta of .1.
93. There is little evidence that money managers perform better on average than the
market. For a popular review of the literature see BURTON G. MALIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DOWN WALL STaEr 157-83 (5th ed. 1990); for a more recent and more technical update
see Burton G. Malkiel, Returns frm Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50J. FIN.
549 (1995). It is therefore improbable that money managers can accurately predict market
movements so as to implement a consistently successful market timing strategy.
94. Besides the lower transaction costs of trading futures contracts rather than stocks,
this strategy permits a more precise beta adjustment, with less difficulty than would be
involved in direct stock sales. For instance, continuing with the example in note 92, supra,
it would be difficult to findjust the right set of stocks to attain the desired portfolio beta of
.1, as low beta stocks are rare. Therefore, a reconstituted stock portfolio would be less
diversified (exposed to more idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk) than the original portfolio.
Note that modem portfolio theory is premised on the market pricing only market or sys-
tematic risk, and not diversifiable (idiosyncratic) risk, because no one will pay for risk that
need not be borne. Beta is the measure of nondiversifiable market risk in one particular
asset-pricing model, the capital-asset-pricing model. See generaly Ross ET AL., supra note 43,
at 241-44.
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cannot increase its value by a purely financial transaction, such as
changing its capital structure. 95
Using the irrelevance theorem in the hedging context, the claim
is that if there are two firms, S and H, which are completely identical
except that H hedges its risk and buys one future for every share, H
shares cannot sell for more than S shares (that is, hedging does not
increase firm value). For if Hshares sold for more than S shares, then
an H shareholder could sell his H share and use the proceeds to buy
an S share and a futures contract and earn arbitrage profits. This
strategy produces an initial net cash inflow because the price of H is
assumed to be higher than the price of S and there is no up-front
payment for a futures contract. But the payoff thereafter is the same,
because the investor receives the same payoff from holding an S share
and a futures contract as he would have received had he simply held
the H share. Similar arbitrage actions by other H shareholders will
push up the price of S and lower the price of H, eliminating the
difference.96
There are, however, limitations with this analysis: there are trans-
action costs and taxes in the real world. First, for the irrelevance theo-
rem to hold in our example, it must be as cheap for investors to hedge
as it is for firms. This may not be the case. The greater volume of the
firm's futures trading compared to the trades of each shareholder
makes it likely that its brokerage fees will be less than the aggregate of
individual shareholders similarly hedging (there are economies of
scale in trading). More important, the firm will know more accurately
its production needs, and hence what futures transactions it must un-
dertake, than will its investors, and it may be very expensive or infeasi-
ble (if, for instance, there are strategic business reasons to keep
production requirements secret from competitors) to provide the in-
formation to the shareholders.97 Nevertheless, as Duffle notes, to the
extent that shareholders are diversified (that is, they own shares in
firms that supply the input whose price risk the firms are hedging),
the high transaction costs argument is less persuasive because the
shareholders would not need to transact in futures to hedge the firm's
input price risk.9"
Second, hedging will benefit even risk-neutral shareholders, if the
shareholders bear bankruptcy costs, because hedging lessens the like-
95. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
96. See DARRELL DUFFIE, FuTUREs MARKETS 228 (1989).
97. Id. at 230.
98. Id.
[VOL. 55:1
REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
lihood of bankruptcy by reducing the variability of firm cash flows. 99
This does not appear to be a very likely explanation, however, as many
active corporate hedgers, such as the McDonald's and Sara Lee Cor-
porations, are not seriously concerned about going bankrupt.
Third, there may be tax advantages to hedging. If a firm's in-
come lies within the range where the tax rate schedule is convex,"°'
then the firm is better off hedging and paying a tax on expected in-
come rather than an expected tax."' However, it should be pointed
out that large corporations, like McDonald's, which have active hedg-
ing programs, are unlikely to be within the kink in the income tax rate
curve where the tax benefits matter. Such corporations do not have
losses and the progressivity in corporate rates ends at very low income
levels. 102
Fourth, information asymmetry between managers and share-
holders concerning management performance may make hedging val-
uable to shareholders. If we make the plausible assumption that
managers are better informed than shareholders concerning how
hard they are working, then managers are likely to know more than
shareholders about whether a firm's poor performance is due to the
managers' lack of effort or bad luck (that is, external events outside of
management's control). If a corporation hedges against losses from
99. Id. at 231. As Smith, Smithson, and Wilford point out, even if financial distress
does not lead to bankruptcy, there are many indirect costs in such situations, such as
higher contracting costs with suppliers who are concerned about the firm's ability to per-
form future commitments and offer less favorable credit terms. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. et
al., Five Reasons Why Companies Should Manage Risk, in THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND
IrrEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 27, at 19-1, 19-11.
100. Convexity refers to kinks in a tax schedule-for example, progressive rates, limits
on loss refundability or carryover, and the alternative minimum tax or windfall profits
tax-that change the tax due discontinuously at the kink.
101. Smith et al., supra note 99, at 19-6 to 19-9. With convexity in the tax rate schedule,
the tax on expected income is not equal to the expected tax. This can be readily seen by
reviewing an example in Smith, Smithson, and Wilford. If a firm will either lose $400 or
earn $600, at a 20% tax rate that fully refunds losses, the firm's expected tax is .5(-400) (.2)
+ .5(600)(.2) = 20, which is the same as the tax on expected income, .2[(.5)(400) +
(.5) (600)] = 20. But if only 10% of losses are refunded (that is, there is only a 50% loss
carryforward), then the expected tax is .5(-400)(.1) + .5(600)(.2) = 40. The expected in-
come, and hence the tax on that amount, however, is unchanged at 20. The firm can
therefore save $20 in taxes by hedging, which ensures that its income is 100 rather than
only expected to be 100 with a 50:50 chance of 600 or -400. Id. at 19-8.
102. To continue with Smith, Smithson, and Wilford's example, the benefit depends on
how much of the pretax income lies in the area of convexity, that is, the spread of income
around zero, because the kink is created by the differential tax treatment of losses and
gains. If the range of income in the example is shifted to the right, to -200 and +800
instead of -400 and +600, then less of the distribution of pretax income would be around
the kink and the benefit of hedging for the firm in the example would fall from $20 to $10.
Id. at 19-9.
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such exogenous events, then the shareholders will be better able to
observe the managers' performance. This is because the hedge en-
ables shareholders to eliminate, as best as possible, the uncertainty or
noise of firm performance generated by price risk, and thus, isolate
the managers' effort.1 0 3
A related explanation of corporate hedging is that if manage-
ment is risk averse, it will require more compensation to bear risk
(that is, to work for a firm with variable cash flows). Hedging will
smooth out the firm's cash flows, and therefore should lower the level
of fixed compensation that management requires. This magnifies the
effect of hedging to reward managers' efforts, now more observable,
rather than managers' luck, because a risk-averse manager whose
compensation depends on events outside of his control will require
more compensation. It should be noted that a managerialist explana-
tion of hedging, which is the implication of the irrelevance theorem,
adopts this last motivation-managers' risk aversion-but sees no
compensating benefit to shareholders.' The managerialist explana-
tion does not expect the shareholders to realize any reduction in com-
pensation costs from corporate hedging.
Finally, hedging may mitigate the problem of inefficient invest-
ment by firms. If capital market imperfections make internally gener-
ated funds cheaper than externally raised funds, then when a firm's
cash flows drop it will underinvest rather than bear the increased cost
of external financing." 5 Hedging is valuable under these circum-
stances because, by reducing the variability of the firm's cash flows, it
103. This argument is similar to the relative performance evaluation literature on man-
agement compensation. See, e.g., Rick Antle & Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the
Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives, 24J. Accr. REs. 1, 32-33 (Spring 1986).
104. Unlike shareholders holding diversified portfolios, managers are subject to
nondiversifiable, firm-specific risk because the bulk of their wealth comes from their em-
ployment income, which often has a performance-based component, and cannot be diver-
sified away. Human capital is not a tradable asset: imperfections in the capital market
prevent managers from being able to borrow today, on the basis of their future earnings,
and invest the proceeds in a diversified stock portfolio. The primary imperfection involves
lenders' recognition of the moral hazard problem, that the probability of repayment is in
the hands of the manager who, once he has the funds, may not work hard and may never
achieve a future income large enough to repay the loan. A similar argument has been
used to explain conglomerate mergers as a mechanism by which managers reduce firm-
specific risk. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELLJ. ECON. 605, 606-09 (1981).
105. Kenneth A. Froot et al., Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Fi-
nancing Policies, 48 J. FIN. 1629 (1993). Froot et al. offer several possible reasons for such
capital market imperfections: asymmetric information between managers and outside in-
vestors concerning firm cash flows, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs (managers prefer
not to be monitored and thus act as if external financing is more costly). Id. at 1633-34.
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ensures the availability of the cheaper capital source, thereby eliminat-
ing the reason to reduce investment when cash flows decline.
Of course, none of these explanations proves that corporate
hedging is in fact being undertaken in the shareholders' interest, to
maximize the value of the firm, as opposed to serving the managers'
interests. But the explanations are at least suggestive of reasons why
the irrelevance theorem is inapplicable and why there is value in cor-
porate hedging. There has not, in fact, been sufficient empirical re-
search on firms' hedging practices to enable us to determine which, if
any, of these explanations is correct. This is due, in part, to the inade-
quacy of disclosure practices. Most studies distinguish firms simply by
whether they use derivatives or not, as indicated in survey responses or
identified by searching financial statements for references to particu-
lar instruments. These studies generally find a positive correlation be-
tween use of derivative instruments and the probability of financial
distress and sometimes find a positive correlation between derivatives
use and more convex tax schedules.1" 6 The crudeness of the data lim-
its the reliability of conclusions, however, because there is no way to
determine the actual uses (hedging or speculative) being made of the
instruments identified in surveys or financial statements.
One study, which overcame this problem by using a unique data
set of gold mining companies whose specific hedging practices are
disclosed in certain analyst research reports, found that firms' hedg-
ing practices were more consistent with managerial risk aversion than
financial distress, tax, or underinvestment explanations. 0 7 While this
is a troubling result from the viewpoint of the theory of the firm, we
do not know how representative the derivatives' usage of the gold
mining industry is of general corporate practice.
In sum, corporate hedging is an area in which the incentive con-
siderations are not very well understood and are not often acknowl-
edged in the literature. In this regard, one proposal that certainly
would benefit shareholders is corporate disclosure of hedging poli-
cies. 1 8 Whether or not corporate hedging benefits shareholders,
shareholders would increase, not decrease, their risk if they hedged
the firm's risk on their own at the same time that the firm was itself
106. See, e.g., Walter Dolde, Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk, 4 J. FIN. ENGINEERING
187 (1995); Deana Nance et al., On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging, 48 J. FIN. 267
(1993).
107. Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management
Practices in the Gold Mining Industry 9-11 (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
108. DuFniE, supra note 96, at 232; Henry Hu, Hedging Expectations: 'Derivative Reality' and
the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. Rxv. 985, 1034-35 (1995).
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hedging. More precise disclosure of hedging practices would prevent
this scenario. It should be noted that, if the corporate entity is a fed-
erally insured bank, then while hedging may be of questionable value
to the bank's shareholders, the practice is plainly in the interest of the
federal government, the deposit insurer, and the true residual claim-
ant.109 As some commentators have contended, had thrift institutions
better managed their asset and liability portfolios by hedging with
some of today's more innovative products, such as swaps, the federal
bailout of the savings and loan industry might have been avoided."'
III. OPTIONS
A. Essential Institutional Features
An option is a contract that gives the owner the right to buy or
sell an asset at a specified price (termed the exercise or strike price)
on or before a specified future date. Options to buy an underlying
asset are referred to as calls; options to sell an underlying asset are
referred to as puts. The buyer of a call, like the long in a futures
contract, is betting that prices will rise above the exercise price. The
buyer of a put, like the short in a futures contract, is betting that
prices will fall. Options that cannot be exercised except upon matur-
ity (the expiration date) are called European options, while those that
can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date are called
American options. Currently, all U.S. exchange-traded individual
stock options are American options, but some stock index options are
European.
Option contracts date from Phoenician and Roman contracts on
the delivery of goods transported by ship and, in more modern times,
from option contracts on Dutch tulip bulbs in the 1600s.1 1 Traded
options date from the eighteenth century in the United States,
although the first options traded on an organized exchange-stock
options-were introduced just two decades ago, 12 by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE), a unit of the CBOT. Options
traded on exchanges today cover numerous assets, including individ-
109. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
110. Safety and Soundness Issues Related to Bank Derivatives Activities-Part 3: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 105-06 (1993)
[hereinafter Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 3] (House Banking Committee Minority
Report) (summarizing banking regulators' response to question whether use of derivatives
by savings and loans could have helped prevent the S&L crisis).
111. Elliot Katz, History of Options, in OPTI S INSTITUTE, OPTIONS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS
AND TRADING STRATEGIES 2 (1990).
112. Id. at 15-16.
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ual stocks, stock indices, currencies, government bonds, and futures
contracts involving agricultural commodities, metals, oil, currency,
and financial instruments. Options are also traded over-the-counter
(off-exchange) by banks and other financial institutions.
As is true of the futures markets, the market in options on finan-
cial futures dwarfs that of all others. In 1991 the total face value of
options on short-term interest rate futures contracts in the United
States alone was $628 billion and that of options on currencies was
$32 billion. 113 The face value of the over-the-counter option market is
estimated to be more than ten times that of the exchange-traded
market. 114
Options create rights, not obligations. The purchaser of an op-
tion can choose not to exercise the right to buy or sell the underlying
asset without penalty. In contrast, the purchaser of a futures contract
cannot walk away from his commitment if he still holds the contract at
its expiration date. Thus, the holder of an option does not have to
exercise if to do so would cause a loss. The seller of the option, who is
also called the option's writer, is, however, obligated to perform. Op-
tion buyers are therefore required to make a payment to the option's
writer upon contract initiation, referred to as the option premium, in
contrast to the buyers of forwards and futures, who pay nothing to
enter into a contract.
As a result of this contract structure of a one-sided obligation and
premium payment, the maximum gain or loss on an option contract is
not symmetrically unlimited for the parties as it is in forward and fu-
tures contracts. The option buyer's loss is limited to the premium
payment because if he would lose money by exercising the option he
does not do so, while the seller's gain is limited to the premium re-
ceived for the option. However, for call options, the seller's loss, rep-
resented by the difference between the exercise price and asset value
at the time of exercise, is theoretically unlimited, as is the buyer's
gain. For put options, the seller's maximum loss and buyer's maxi-
mum gain is equal to the exercise price (the outcome when the stock
price falls to zero).
A call option whose exercise price is below the stock price is said
to be "in-the-money," while one whose exercise price is greater than
the stock price is said to be "out-of-the-money." The converse is true
113. GROUP OF 30, supra note 24, at 34 n.8. The General Accounting Office's estimate of
the worldwide value for 1992 of exchange-traded interest rate and currency options, and
off-exchange interest rate options is approximately $2 trillion. GAO REPORT, supra note
11, at 187.
114. CHANcE, supra note 21, at 26.
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for a put option. Because the option investor's loss is limited-he
does not have to exercise an out-of-the-money option-there is a dis-
continuity or kink in the option payoff function. When, at expiration,
the option is out-of-the-money, the option holder earns no return,
and when it is in-the-money the return is the difference between the
stock and exercise price. Thus, the option holder's payoff at expira-
tion dramatically changes as the stock price rises above the exercise
price. The value of the option, accordingly, does not change in a one-
to-one fashion with the stock price as does the value of a forward or
futures contract; it does so only when the stock price exceeds the exer-
cise price.
This nonlinear or discontinuous payoff structure makes option
pricing far more complex than futures and forward contract pricing.
It also means that the option holder benefits from increased risk (vari-
ance) in the underlying asset's returns. The option holder's downside
loss is fixed regardless of how low the asset price drops (he loses only
the previously paid premium) but he receives all of the upside
return. 1
5
There is one clearinghouse for all U.S. exchange-traded stock op-
tions, the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). The OCC functions
similarly to the futures exchanges' clearinghouses; it is an intermedi-
ary in all transactions and guarantees the sellers' performance. (Be-
cause premiums are paid up front, and buyers of options have no
obligations, there is no issue of nonperformance on the long side of
an option contract.) All option trades must be cleared through OCC
members, who must meet minimum capital requirements and main-
tain margin accounts with the OCC.
Clearing firms, correspondingly, require margin deposits from
the actual option writers if they do not already own the stock. If they
own the stock, then the writers need deposit no more than the margin
required for purchasing the stock itself. However, should the stock
115. This is why bank shareholders, unlike the federal government, would like their
managers to take on increased risk. Because of deposit insurance, bank shareholders are
equivalent to option holders, as they do not have to cover the deposits if risky loans pro-
duce a loss. Indeed, the same analysis applies to shareholders in general in a levered firm.
These shareholders can be understood as having a put option on the firm because of
limited liability. If the firm cannot pay off the bondholders at maturity, then the share-
holders exercise their put: they "sell" the firm to the bondholders for the asset value,
which is less than the bond value. If at maturity the value of the assets is greater than the
bonds, then they do not exercise the put and simply repay the bondholders instead..
Levered stock can also be characterized as a call option: if the firm's value exceeds the
debt, the shareholders exercise the call and "buy" the firm from the bondholders by paying
off the loan. They let the call expire if the firm value is less than the debt, leaving the firm
to the bondholders. See Ross ET AL., supra note 43, at 634-42.
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price rise above the exercise price, the maximum amount the investor
may borrow on the stock is based on the lower exercise price rather
than the stock price. An option whose writer owns the underlying
asset is referred to as a covered option, while an option whose writer
does not own the asset when it is written is referred to as a naked
option. Naked options are obviously riskier than covered options
(hence the higher margin requirement). If prices rise dramatically, a
covered option writer will be able to perform because he has the asset
on hand, whereas the naked writer has to go into the market to cover
and may not have the cash to do so. The writer's loss is the same in
either case.
Option positions are not marked to market on a daily basis as are
futures positions. This is not a surprising difference given the asym-
metry of the obligation. If the option is worthless at expiration, the
buyer does not owe the option writer any further payment. The profit
or loss is unknown until expiration or exercise, and, in this sense,
there is no daily loss or gain accumulating over a contract's life.
B. Regulatory Regime
Stock options and options on securities are regulated by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Options on futures con-
tracts, called commodity options, are regulated by the CFTC. Such
options were prohibited by federal law until 1982, when the CFTC was
authorized to permit commodity option trading on an experimental
basis,' 6 an experiment that was so successful that trading was perma-
nently authorized in 1987. The regulatory regime for options thus
depends on the underlying asset. For currency options, however, the
regulatory regime is determined by the exchange upon which the op-
tion trades. Those traded on exchanges registered with the SEC (na-
tional stock exchanges) are regulated by the SEC, and those traded on
116. Prior to 1974 when all traded futures came to be regulated, options were traded on
nonregulated commodities, as the statutory ban on options only applied to regulated com-
modities. With the inclusion of all futures under the CFTC'sjurisdiction in 1974, Congress
instructed the CFTC to determine whether then-traded options on the newly covered con-
tracts should also be banned. Without that proviso, the trading would have had to cease
because the underlying assets were now regulated. As a result, the business would have
moved abroad. In fact, one reason advanced for expanding regulation to all commodities
was the inability of the existing regulatory agency to enjoin commodity option trading, or
otherwise take action, regarding a highly publicized scandal in which a firm that had been
selling naked options on unregulated commodities failed, producing $100 million in inves-
tor losses. Review of Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Agriclture, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 11 (1973) (statement of Rep. Neal
Smith).
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exchanges registered with the CFTC (futures exchanges) are regu-
lated by the CFTC.
There is no economic reason for the fragmented regulatory treat-
ment of options. This is underscored by the bizarre basis for the
choice of regulator for exchange-traded currency options. The re-
gime is simply the patchwork product of a political compromise in a
longstanding jurisdictional turf battle between the SEC and the CFTC
and their clientele exchanges. 117
Section 9(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes
the SEC to set the terms and conditions of exchange trading of op-
tions on equity securities.11 ' Off-exchange traded options on ex-
empted securities (government securities and securities issued by
banks) are excluded from the SEC's jurisdiction." 9 The congres-
sional committee that investigated the 1929 stock market crash and
whose work led to the enactment of the federal securities laws had
recommended banning options, but confronted with vigorous opposi-
tion from option dealers, Congress chose instead to require agency
approval of option trading through its rulemaking authority. 120
Security options trading is governed largely by a self-regulatory
system of exchange and dealer association rules approved by the SEC.
The option exchanges require all customer accounts for option trad-
ing to be specifically approved in writing and to meet strict suitability
tests, such as the investor's reasonable ability to evaluate and bear the
risks of option trades. These requirements reflect the greater risk of
options investments compared to ordinary security investments. In
addition, special disclosure documents must be transmitted to inves-
tors prior to trading. These documents are filed with the SEC for re-
view and detail the unique features of options, including their risks
117. The SEC-CFTC jurisdictional accord is codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1994). Former
CFTC Chairman Philip Johnson, who fashioned the interagency accord divvying up op-
tions in 1982, has offered his view of the jurisdictional mess. See Philip M. Johnson, Reflec-
tions on CFTC/SECJurisdiction, in PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES
REGULATION 114-21 (2d ed. Supp. 1991), and 2JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 55, at 279.
AsJohnson discusses, the SEC's challenge to the CFTC'sjurisdiction over futures on securi-
ties began as soon as the CFTC was created. But even when the agencies themselves do not
dispute a jurisdictional issue, the futures exchanges have objected to encroachments on
the CFTC's jurisdiction, and the courts have upheld their complaints. See, e.g., Board of
Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.) (Ginnie Mae options), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982); Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (Index Participa-
tion Units).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1994).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (42) (D).
120. Brandon Becker & Jeffrey P. Bums, Regulation of Exchange-Traded Options, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS, supra note 40, at 679, 680-81.
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and the mechanisms of trading. Broker-dealers are subject to net cap-
ital requirements and option markets impose position limits on the
number of contracts that can be held or exercised within a specified
time period. Finally, the antifraud provisions governing transactions
in securities are applicable to options on securities. 121 Commodity op-
tion trading is regulated under the regime for futures already
discussed.
C. Uses of Options
The uses of options are similar to those of forwards and futures,
as hedges against price risk and as levered speculation. In what is
known as a protective put strategy, an investor who seeks to protect a
stock portfolio from price declines purchases put options on the
stock, and thereby sets a floor value for his portfolio equal to the exer-
cise price of the put. In contrast to a hedging strategy of selling fu-
tures against a long position in the cash market, buying put options
permits an investor to gain from price increases because puts need
not be exercised when the price rises. The gain in the cash market
position, however, is reduced by the put premium.
An investor can eliminate risk entirely by properly combining a
portfolio of options and underlying assets, analogous to how risk can
be eliminated by combining a portfolio of offsetting futures and un-
derlying asset positions. The hedge, however, is much more difficult
to construct with options. This is due to the kink in the payoff func-
tion, the option's walk-away feature that limits option holders' losses
and makes the pricing relation between the option and underlying
asset nonlinear. Nonlinearity means that the number of options nec-
121. The courts have had difficulty applying the insider-trading prohibitions of the se-
curities antifraud provision, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, to option trading. In
particular, the fiduciary duty requirement of Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980), is difficult to meet because corporate insiders are not considered to stand in a
fiduciary relationship to option holders, as opposed to equityholders. Congress attempted
to resolve this problem by provisions in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (amending § 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act) (codified at
78 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994)), and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
.of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (adding § 20A to the Securities Exchange Act)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994)), which expressly included options trading. See Har-
vey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider Trading in Non-Equity
Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187 (1993). Similar interpretative problems existed under the
short-swing profits prohibition of § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, which the SEC
sought to resolve by a comprehensive reform of its implementing regulations in 1991.
Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, 56
Fed. Reg. 7242 (1991) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 270, 274). See Karl
Shumper Okamoto, Oversimplification and the SEC's Treatment of Derivative Securities Trading
by Corporate Insiders, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1287.
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essary to hedge a cash position will vary with the asset price. As a
result, an option-hedged portfolio must be continuously adjusted to
maintain a risk-free position. Because the transaction costs of contin-
uous adjustment are prohibitive, most such hedges are updated only
periodically. Therefore, an investor hedging with options bears signif-
icant risk in the interim between portfolio adjustments.
The nonlinearity of option pricing does have benefits-it creates
richer opportunities for speculative trading strategies than those at-
tainable with futures. This constitutes options' great attraction.
Through a judicious combination of options, investors can obtain vir-
tually any different payoff function they wish.122
IV. SWAPS
A. Essential Institutional Features
A swap is a contract between two parties, referred to as
counterparties, to exchange a series of cash flows over time. A swap
agreement specifies the currencies to be exchanged, rate of interest
applicable, payment timetable, and ancillary issues bearing on the re-
lationship between the counterparties. Swap payments are calculated
on the basis of hypothetical quantities of the underlying asset referred
to as "notionals." In most swaps other than currency swaps, the no-
tional amount does not trade hands and is not at risk.
Swaps are customized contracts and they are not traded on ex-
changes. The primary dealers in swaps are commercial banks, as is
true of the largest forward market, foreign currency. This fact is not
fortuitous. Swaps developed, in part, as an offshoot of foreign cur-
rency transactions, for which banks provided the principal
intermediation.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a
trade association of swap dealers, has developed a standard form con-
tract for swaps that defines the instruments' terms and the
122. The standard option texts all provide an introduction to the basic combinatory
trading strategies, such as spreads, straddles, straps, strips, and strangles. See, e.g., HULL,
supra note 44, at 175-87. The trader who brought down Barings had, among other posi-
tions, assumed a very large short straddle in Nikkei 225 index options. See Sheryl WuDunn,
Osaka, a Venue for Making Big Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at D6. This strategy consists of
selling an equal number of puts and calls with the same exercise price and expiration date
on the same underlying asset. Such a strategy profits if the price of the asset stays within a
narrow trading range around the exercise price. It is a highly risky strategy, because if the
asset price moves substantially in any direction, the straddle writer loses. Unfortunately for
the Barings trader, after he established his position there was a severe earthquake in Japan,
and the Nikkei dropped substantially, falling way outside of the range in which his position
was profitable. Id.
[VOL. 55:1
REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
counterparties' responsibilities upon default or early termination.
Standardized documentation is intended to mitigate or resolve legal
questions surrounding a contract, particularly issues arising in the
case of a counterparty's insolvency. The key price, duration, and
quantity terms remain customized to the counterparties, in contrast
with standardized futures contracts. The standardization in swap doc-
umentation is therefore directed at resolving legal uncertainty rather
than enhancing market liquidity (product tradeability). Accordingly,
swap agreements not only have greater variation in terms than futures
contracts, but also are not tradable or assignable without both
counterparties' consent. This restriction on transfer is an important
protective feature for counterparties because the absence of a
clearinghouse in the swap market requires a counterparty's
creditworthiness to be ascertained and monitored.
The simplest interest rate swap, termed a "plain vanilla" swap, is a
fixed-for-floating interest rate swap. In such a swap, one counterparty
agrees to make fixed-rate payments to the other counterparty, who
agrees to make floating-rate payments in return. The fixed-rate payer
is conventionally characterized as holding the long position (the swap
buyer), and the floating-rate payer is characterized as the short." 3 In
practice, rather than each counterparty paying its respective payment,
only the differential between the counterparties' payments changes
hands. That is, if the fixed-rate payment due is, say, $600,000 and the
floating-rate payment $500,000, the fixed-rate payer pays $100,000 to
the floating-rate payer. The most common floating rate used in swaps
is the six- or three-month LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate),
the rate of interest offered by banks on deposits by other banks in
Eurocurrency markets. These are markets for nondomestic curren-
cies: Eurodollar instruments are dollar-denominated instruments is-
sued in a European country.
There are numerous variants on the plain vanilla interest rate
swap. These will only be briefly mentioned here, as a detailed under-
standing of the permutations is not necessary to grasp the key eco-
nomic and regulatory issues. Amortizing or accreting swaps are swaps
in which payment amounts change over time (decreasing and increas-
ing, respectively). An amortizing swap payment schedule reflects, for
example, the declining payment schedule of an amortizing loan. De-
ferred swaps are swaps where the exchange of interest rate payments is
deferred to a date later than the initiation of the contract. Basis swaps
123. If this seems confusing, consider the fixed payer as purchasing today, tomorrow's
interest rate on a loan. He benefits if rates go up, just as the long in a wheat futures
contract benefits if wheat prices rise.
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are swaps in which both sides or legs of the swap float but are pegged
to different interest rate indexes. For example, one side may be
pegged to LIBOR and the other to U.S. Treasury bill or commercial
paper rates. Callable or putable swaps are swap contracts where the
fixed-rate payer, or floating-rate payer, respectively, has the right to
terminate the contract early.
There are also options on swaps, called swaptions, that give the
holder the right to enter into a specified swap at a later date, or to
terminate or extend an existing swap at a later date. Interest rate
swaps are often combined with specific interest rate options, termed
caps or floors, that fix, respectively, a maximum or minimum interest
rate payment for the floating side of the swap contract. A contract
that combines a cap and a floor is called a collar. A collar is typically
used by a floating-rate payer that wants to limit its risk by buying a cap,
but finds the cap too expensive. The floating-rate payer can reduce
the cost of the cap to an affordable level by selling a floor, thus con-
structing a collar. Depending on the trigger rates of the cap and the
floor, the premium received for the floor may exactly offset the pre-
mium paid for the cap. The floating-rate payer gives up some of the
gain it would receive from falling rates to reduce the cost of limiting
the losses it would bear from rising rates. Finally, swaps and embed-
ded options where a multiplier is used to determine the interest rate
payments are called turbo or power swaps and options. A multiplier
enables the swap investor to leverage his position. There is a substan-
tial market for swap-related options. In 1991 the total notional princi-
pal outstanding of caps, floors, collars, and swaptions was $577
billion. 12
4
In a typical plain vanilla transaction, a financial institution deal-
ing in swaps enters into a swap contract with one counterparty in
which the dealer pays a floating rate and receives a fixed rate, and an
offsetting contract with another counterparty in which the dealer pays
fixed and receives floating. In essence, the counterparties' payments
are exchanged, but it is the dealer who is liable on their respective
contracts. Thus, the dealer's creditworthiness is all that matters to
each particular counterparty. The dealer earns a margin equal to the
differential in fixed rates charged across the two contracts for its serv-
ices, equivalent to a bid-ask spread, the difference between the
amount a dealer offers to pay for an instrument and what the dealer
will sell it for.
124. GROUP OF 30, supra note 24, at 34 n.7.
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The most common swap after the interest rate swap is the cur-
rency swap. Currency swaps involve the exchange of currencies as well
as fixed-for-floating interest rate exchanges, although the simplest cur-
rency swaps exchange only currencies with both sides paying fixed
rates. The notional principal amount is exchanged at the beginning
and end of a currency swap because, in contrast to the notional princi-
pal in an interest rate swap, the value of the principal in a currency
rate swap will change over the contract's term if exchange rates vary
from the contract's start to finish.
Because a swap contract consists of a series of cash payments
made according to a prespecified formula, in which each period's
floating-rate payment is set by the rate in effect in the prior period, it
is equivalent to a portfolio of forward contracts. Thus a taxonomy of
generic derivatives could include swaps as a species of forward con-
tract. It is helpful, however, to distinguish swap contracts for two rea-
sons. First, swaps are not truly a redundant instrument. The
transaction costs of interest rate swaps are lower, for instance, than
packages of interest rate forward contracts because each forward con-
tract has to be negotiated separately, and the rapid growth of the swap
market has made it more liquid than the forward market, particularly
forward contracts with long maturity terms.'2 5 Second, the swap mar-
ket has been a principal focus of current regulatory concern.126
Swap contracts originated in loan agreements initiated in the
United Kingdom in the 1970s in order to avoid government controls
on foreign exchange transactions. These controls were intended to
prevent the outflow of capital into foreign investments. For instance,
a U.S. corporation needing to finance the operations of its U.K. sub-
sidiary, and a U.K firm needing to finance a U.S. subsidiary, would
enter into either "parallel" or "back-to-back" loan contracts. 1 27 In this
dual-loan arrangement, the U.S. corporation borrowed funds in its
domestic market and lent the dollars it borrowed to the U.K firm.
The U.K firm borrowed an equivalent amount in its domestic market
and lent the pounds sterling it borrowed to the U.S. firm. Each firm
was thereby able to access the capital market of a foreign country and
fund its subsidiary's operations without any exchange of currency in
the foreign exchange market. Such an arrangement avoided the sub-
stantial tax imposed by the British government's regulation of foreign
exchange transactions involving its own currency.
125. FABozzi & MOIGLLANI, supra note 38, at 638-39.
126. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 11.
127. The following discussion of these contracts is based on JOHN F. MARSHALL & KEN-
NETH R. KAPNER, UNDERSTANDING SWAPs 4-5 (1993).
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At the same time that it solved the problem of foreign investment
access, the dual-loan arrangement created new problems. One prob-
lem it created was a need for matching-the U.S. corporation needed
to find a U.K. firm with identical financial needs, in terms of interest,
principal, and timing of payments. Another problem with the dual-
loan structure was that if one firm defaulted on its obligation to the
other, the second firm was not relieved of its obligation to the first,
because the arrangement consisted of two independent loan con-
tracts. These problems were resolved with the development of swaps.
Swaps mitigate the default problem by creating a single agreement to
exchange payments, thereby clarifying the parties' set-off rights. The
matching problem also was solved. As the swap market developed,
financial institutions intervened as brokers and dealers who "ware-
housed" swaps, that is, they immediately assumed the other side of a
swap contract for a customer and thereafter arranged an offsetting
swap or otherwise hedged the risk of unmatched contracts by transac-
tions in futures.
In 1979 Salomon Brothers wrote the first currency swap for IBM
and the World Bank. Interest rate swaps were created in 1981, and
were publicized in a transaction by Deutsche Bank in 1982.128 The
swap market's growth has been as explosive as that of other derivative
markets (see Table 1).1 9 The size of the swap market is difficult to
ascertain precisely because the market is an international over-the-
counter dealer market and, unlike contracts traded on public ex-
changes, transactions are not reported to authorities. At the end of
1991, the outstanding notional principal amount for the two most
prevalent swap types, interest rate and currency swaps, was $3.87 tril-
lion.13 1 Of this sum, $1.95 trillion was new contracts written in
1991.131 Of course, using notional values to measure the swap mar-
ket's size drastically overstates it, as notionals are only baseline figures
used for calculating contractual payments. The level of funds actually
at risk in swap contracts has been estimated at about two percent of
the notional amount. 132
Two swap types of more recent origin are commodity and equity
swaps. Commodity swaps involve fixed-for-floating rate exchanges
128. For a brief history of this period of swap development, see SATYAjrr DAS, SwAPs &
DERIVATIVE FINANCING 15 (rev. ed. 1993).
129. See supra p. 5.
130. GROUP OF 30, supra note 24, at 54. The General Accounting Office estimated that
in 1992 the notional amount for such swaps was $4.7 trillion. GAO REPORT, supra note 11,
at 187.
131. GROUP OF 30, supra note 24, at 54.
132. Id. at 59.
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where the notional is some quantity of a commodity, such as oil, and
the floating price is an average of periodic observations of the spot
price of the commodity. For example, an oil producer can fix the
price it receives for oil for several years by entering into a commodity
swap, with the notional a specified quantity of oil, in which the pro-
ducer pays the average daily spot price for oil and receives a specified
fixed rate per barrel. Equity swaps have floating rates pegged to the
total return on some stock index, such as the S & P 500 index. As
might be expected of more recent products, the commodity and eq-
uity swap markets are far smaller than the interest rate and currency
swap markets-in 1992 they totaled $28 billion in notional
principal.13
3
B. Credit and Legal Risk in Swap Contracts
As a consequence of the swap market's being an off-exchange
(over-the-counter) market with no clearinghouse arrangement, par-
ticipants in swaps are subject to the risk of their counterparty's de-
fault. This is termed credit risk. Swap market participants therefore
tend to have the very highest credit ratings. Parties seeking to enter
into a swap will not transact with poor credit risks, and low credit
counterparties typically must post collateral or provide other security
guaranteeing payment in order to participate in the market. In fact,
securities firms desiring to enter the market as dealers have estab-
lished separately capitalized subsidiaries that obtain AAA credit rat-
ings to transact their swap business in order to compete with
commercial banks, whose substantial capital gives them the highest
credit ratings. A recent survey of major swap dealers found that
ninety-four percent of their business (by notional amount or by cur-
rent credit exposure) was with counterparties rated at investment
grade (BBB or better)."4 The concern for creditworthiness contrib-
utes to swap market concentration." 5 Few firms have both the re-
sources necessary to be as creditworthy as dealers and the ability to
invest in the complex risk-management systems necessary to run a
swap operation successfully.
It is important to recognize that the credit risk from an interest
rate swap is considerably less than the credit risk of a loan, a bank's
133. Id. at 57.
134. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 159.
135. Eight U.S. commercial bank swap dealers accounted for 56% (notional amount) of
interest rate and currency swaps worldwide as of 1991, and the top seven U.S. bank swap
dealers (by notional amount) accounted for more than 90% of all U.S. bank derivatives
activity as of 1992. Id. at 36.
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more conventional business activity. In contrast to a loan, no princi-
pal is exchanged in a swap. Therefore, the principal amount is not a
liability (this is why measuring the market by notional amount is mis-
leading). The loss upon a counterparty default is a swap's replace-
ment cost, which is the difference in value between the initial contract
terms and current market terms for an identical contract. For exam-
ple, if a dealer's defaulting counterparty is the fixed-rate receiver and
if interest rates have risen in the interim, then the fixed rate required
to enter into a new swap of the same duration will also have risen.
Consequently, the dealer will have to pay a higher fixed rate on the
replacement swap or pay the present value of the difference up front
to induce someone to assume the defaulting counterparty's position
in the original swap contract.
While there is always credit risk with a loan (payments go only to
the lending bank), swap counterparties experience a loss upon a de-
fault only when the value of the swap is positive, for instance, when
the nondefaulting counterparty, and not the defaulting counterparty,
is netting a cash inflow on the payments exchange. Thus, a
counterparty's insolvency is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for a swap dealer's loss. In fact, for several reasons, a counterparty's
probability of default is often independent of the value of its position
in a swap contract. First, swaps may be hedged or represent only a
very small percent of a firm's total portfolio of assets and liabilities.
Second, the factors affecting the value of the swap, such as interest
rates, may be unrelated to the factors affecting a counterparty's finan-
cial condition, such as changes in demand for a firm's products, or, in
the case of a bank, Third World debt or real estate exposure.1 3 6
In addition to credit risk, swap market transactors may bear sig-
nificant legal risks not shared by futures market participants. These
risks include corporate authority or capacity to enter into a swap con-
tract, and contract enforceability in bankruptcy or insolvency. The
legal risk involving corporate authority or capacity is that certain enti-
ties may not have the legal capacity to enter into a swap agreement. A
contract entered into without capacity can be deemed ultra vires and
thus held to be unenforceable, which would permit the entity to avoid
136. See HULL, supra note 44, at 457-58. Gregory Duffee contends that the fixed-pay-
ment receiver bears more credit risk than the fixed-payment payer because the probability
of default is positively correlated with declines in interest rates and it is the fixed receiver
(that is, floating payer) whose side of a swap has positive value in such an environment.
Gregory R. Duffee, On Measuring Credit Risks of Derivative Instruments, Federal Reserve
Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Research Paper No. 94-27 passim (Sept.
1994).
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its obligations on contracts with a negative value. Over half of all
losses from counterparty defaults in the swap market to date arose
from one such situation,13 7 a 1992 ruling by the British House of
Lords that U.K. local government authorities did not have the capacity
to enter into swaps.13 1 Swap market participants typically seek legal
opinions and documentation concerning counterparties' capacity to
engage in transactions. That did not help in the U.K. case, where
practitioners had opined that local governments, incidental to their
ability to borrow, had the capacity to engage in swaps.13 9
The capacity of local government units in the United States to
engage in swaps is a matter of state law, and hence varies across the
states. Some states, such as California, have statutes explicitly permit-
ting governments' use of swaps and other derivative instruments,1 40
although since Orange County's financial debacle, proposals have
been made to rescind that authority. 4 In states without explicit au-
thorization, the common-law analysis might well follow the House of
Lords' reasoning. However, the narrower interpretation of the lower
British court, that the use of swaps for hedging as opposed to specula-
tion is incidental to the capacity to borrow, 142 is the better approach
from a public policy perspective. A prudent fiduciary should mini-
mize the cost of public financing when it can be done with appropri-
ately low risk. In the wake of recent losses on derivative investments, a
few governmental entities have brought lawsuits raising ultra vires is-
sues, but none as yet has been adjudicated. 14  The legal capacity of
137. GROUP OF 30, supra note 24, at 51.
138. Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2 App. Cas.
1, 37 (appeal taken from Q.B.). The House of Lords found that there was neither express
nor implied authority for municipalities to enter into swaps under the statute from which
local authorities derived their powers.
139. Id. at 29.
140. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 5903(c) (Deering 1994).
141. See, e.g., S. 340, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1995 Cal. S.B. 340 (1995). Some states have
imposed restrictions on derivatives investments in the wake of losses. See Tracy Sacco, Strict
Texas Public-Funds Restrictions Raise Concerns Amid Derivative Losses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
1995, at BllB.
142. Hazell v. Hammersmith, [1990] 2 Q.B. 697.
143. E.g., County Comm'rs v. Liberty Capital Mkts., No. DKC94-CV-2188 (D. Md. 1994).
The Maryland case, proceeding against four brokers who did not settle, is for $7 million.
That sum represents the amount not recovered from a settlement entered into with the
other brokers of what was originally a $30 million loss from investments in structured notes
and mortgage derivatives, when the statute authorized investment in short-term or U.S.
government-backed securities only. See Betsy Pisnik, Charles County Survives Derivatives Fling:
Official Broke Rules to Invest $31 Million, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at D5. The presence of
statutory authority to invest in derivatives may not negate the capacity question. Among
the many potential issues raised by Orange County's losses is whether excessive speculation
in derivatives is not only imprudent but also outside the statutory intent.
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local governments to enter into swaps in other countries, such as Bra-
zil, Canada, and Germany, is also uncertain. 44
The legal risk in insolvency involves the enforceability of close-out
netting arrangements, a common provision in swap contracts to miti-
gate credit risk. When two parties have entered into more than one
swap contract, a close-out netting arrangement nets the exposures on
all of the transactions and terminates all of the contracts in one final
payment upon triggering events, such as a counterparty's insolvency.
If a bankruptcy trustee does not have to abide by the netting proce-
dure and can follow the conventional insolvency rule of choosing
which contracts of the debtor it will uphold, the trustee can "cherry
pick" among the outstanding swaps and choose to enforce only those
with a positive value to the insolvent firm. In addition, a bankruptcy
filing stays payments to creditors and may require a creditor to repay
funds paid out by the debtor during a specified period before the
filing in which payouts are presumptively treated as a fraud on other
creditors. Such bankruptcy code provisions prevent the debtor from
paying a final close-out netting payment on a swap contract, and im-
peach the validity of a periodic payment under the swap contract
made prior to an insolvency filing.
For U.S. counterparties, three pieces of congressional legisla-
tion-1990 amendments to the federal bankruptcy code, 145 and
19891" and 1991147 legislation dealing with banks and financial insti-
tutions-eliminated the difficulties in insolvency proceedings for swap
agreements. These provisions created an exemption for swaps from
the automatic stay and trustee termination rights in each of the rele-
vant insolvency regimes and gave effect to netting provisions.1 4' The
legal risks remain, however, in other jurisdictions where there is no
explicit statutory protection comparable to that adopted by the
United States. 149 Swap dealers cite the enforceability of netting agree-
ments as their greatest legal concern.150
144. Working Paper of theEnforceability Subcommittee, in GROup oF 30, supra note 24, app. I,
48, 56-58 [hereinafter Enforceability Working Paper].
145. Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, 104 Stat. 267 (amending 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362, 546, 548, 553, 556, 560 (1994)).
146. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994)).
147. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4407 (1994)).
148. Enforceability Working Paper, supra note 144, at 54-55.
149. Id. at 55-58.
150. Id. The Subcommittee also suggests that certain relatively technical modifications
to the relevant U.S. bankruptcy laws should be undertaken to guarantee swap enforceabil-
ity, such as an expanded definition of swaps under the bankruptcy provisions. Id. at 60.
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C. Regulatoiy Regime
The dominance of banks in the swap market has resulted in swaps
being exempted from regulation by the CFTC. Swaps, as customized
contracts transacted off-exchange, do not resemble conventional fu-
tures contracts, and one would expect that the forward-future distinc-
tion defining the CFTC's regulatory authority would exclude swaps.
Nevertheless, the absence of a statutory definition of either a forward
or a futures contract always renders the legality of any off-exchange
derivative contract open to question. In 1987 the CFTC indicated an
intention, in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, to review
whether it should regulate commodity swaps.' 51 The agency implied
that it might find such swaps to be unauthorized (non-exchange-
traded) futures contracts, and it simultaneously launched an enforce-
ment investigation into the Chase Manhattan Bank's dealer activi-
ties.15 Presumably it chose to investigate commodity swaps, rather
than interest-rate and currency swaps, because the latter contracts are
more directly related to the types of financial instruments specifically
excluded from the CFTC's jurisdiction under the Treasury
amendment.
The notice and investigation of Chase Manhattan's commodity
swap activity produced serious consternation among swap market par-
ticipants, and domestic commodity business ceased as all deals moved
overseas. 153 Because swaps are one of the areas of significant profit-
ability for the largest money-center banks, and an important risk-man-
agement tool for hundreds of smaller banks, the CFTC action (even
though limited to commodity swaps, which constitute a relatively small
fraction of banks' swap business) was of concern to banking regulators
as well as their constituent banks. In 1989, "bowing," as one commis-
sioner put it, "to the firestorm of criticism precipitated by its enforce-
ment action,"" 4 the CFTC reversed its position and issued a release
detailing a safe harbor for most swaps from CEA regulation. 155
Additional problems may arise for currency swaps, concerning whether ajudgment can be
awarded in a currency other than the local currency. See, e.g.,J. Trevor Brown, Enghish Law
and Swaps, in THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RiSK MANAGEMENT, supra
note 27, at 35-1, 35-18 to -20; DIANE B. WuNNICKE ET AL., CORPORATE FINANcIAL RISK MAN-
AGEMENT 62-63 (1992).
151. CFI'C Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (1987).
152. Id.
153. See Sheila C. Bair, Regtdatoiy Issues Presented by the Growth of OTC Derivatives: Why Off-
Exchange Is No Longer Off-Limits, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS, supra
note 40, at 699, 700.
154. Id.
155. Id.; CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694
(1989).
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The CFTC's policy switch was insufficient to appease the banking
industry, and the treatment of swaps was one of numerous issues that
delayed the CFTC's 1989 reauthorization legislation until 1992. The
1991 Senate bill mandated exclusion of swaps from the CFTC'sjuris-
diction, 156 largely in response to the lobbying efforts of banking regu-
lators and swap market participants. Futures exchanges, fearful that
they would lose business to an unregulated swap market, opposed the
Senate's exclusion.1 57 They were successful in the Conference Com-
mittee, which adopted the alternative provision that the exchanges
had supported in the 1991 House bill, giving the CFTC the authority
to exempt transactions or classes of transactions from any or all provi-
sions of the CEA, so long as the exempted transactions were between
"appropriate persons" (institutions)."8 The House version also con-
tained a provision directing the CFTC to "promptly... exercise the
exemptive authority" with respect to swaps.' 59 In a further gesture to
the futures exchanges' concerns, the Conference Report instructed
the CFTC to apply its new power in a "fair and even-handed manner
to products and systems sponsored by exchanges and non-exchanges
alike," and to "provide legal certainty to the existing OTC markets"
without giving them "undue competitive advantages" and without
commencing a "wide-scale deregulation of the futures markets."' 6 °
In January 1993 the CFTC exempted swaps between certain
classes of investors, specified institutions and persons with assets over
$10 million, from operation of all but the antifraud and manipulation
provisions of the CEA, in a final order patterned after the Senate's
mandatory provision.1 61 The exemption was qualified, requiring that
the swaps not be standardized contracts, nor subject to a clearing-
house arrangement, and that the counterparties' creditworthiness be
a material consideration in entering into the transaction. 162 The con-
ditions for qualifying swaps were intended to protect the competitive-
ness of futures exchanges, which had objected to the exemptive order,
by preventing swaps with the essential characteristics of futures con-
tracts from being unregulated, and therefore cheaper, than futures.
The futures exchanges subsequently sought an exemption from
CFTC regulation for futures and options transactions conducted on
156. S. 207, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
157. Bair, supra note 153, at 701.
158. H.R. 707, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
159. Id.
160. H.R. REP. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 74, 78 (1992), quoted in Bair, supra note
153, at 702.
161. CFrC Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1995).
162. Id.
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exchanges by professional and institutional traders, under the 1992
exemptive authority provision. The Commission agreed to only a lim-
ited exemption, proposing a three-year pilot program.163 Under the
new program, certain transactions would be exempt from some CEA
requirements, such as the requirement that trades occur on an ex-
change floor, while the investor protection and financial integrity pro-
visions would continue to apply. The exchanges, dissatisfied with the
outcome, recrafted their proposal more narrowly to mimic the swap
exemption regarding participating investors and products, but there
is no reason to believe that the agency will treat the revised proposal
any more favorably.
As acknowledged in the CFTC's rule exempting swaps, issuance
of the exemption does not settle whether swaps are futures contracts
within the meaning of the CEA. Notwithstanding this acknowledg-
ment, the CFTC brought an enforcement action against Bankers
Trust Corporation of New York, a major swap dealer, for violating the
antifraud provisions of the CEA in a series of leveraged interest rate
swaps with Gibson Greetings, Inc. 1" In order to hold the dealer lia-
ble, the Commission reasoned that Bankers Trust was acting as a com-
modity trading advisor (CTA) when it transacted with Gibson rather
than a broker-dealer. This characterization was crucial because, un-
like securities brokers, who must determine that a particular product
is suitable for the customer before selling it, futures commission
merchants are not subject to a general suitability requirement.165
The Bankers Trust action is a disturbing exercise of agency juris-
diction, as interest rate swaps clearly are not futures contracts under
existing precedent. 66 Accordingly, it is difficult to see how Bankers
Trust can be considered a CTA when the products in which it was
dealing were neither commodity futures nor options. The CFTC was
able to get away with such obvious overreaching because of damaging
tapes indicating Bankers Trust employees had deliberately misled Gib-
son concerning the extent of its losses, 167 and the scandal-like atmos-
phere surrounding the case. Nevertheless, the case may not be an
odd exception for exceptional factual circumstances to an otherwise
163. CFTC Section 4(c) Contract Market Transactions; Swap Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg.
54,139 (1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 35, 36) (proposed Oct. 28, 1994).
164. In reBT Securities Corp., No. 95-3, 1994 FSEG-FC WL 711224 (CFTC Dec. 22,
1994). BT Securities is the wholly-owned swap subsidiary of Bankers Trust.
165. See Bieganek v. Wilson, 642 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1986). In fact, the CFTC order
against Bankers Trust expressly stated that it made no finding concerning the suitability of
the derivative transactions for Gibson. BT Securities Corp. at *2 n.3.
166. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
167. BT Securities Corp. at *2.
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restrained regulatory policy seemingly suggested by the swap exemp-
tion rule. The former CFTC Chairman, Mary Schapiro, unlike her
predecessor who promoted deregulation, aggressively expanded the
agency's authority, seizing the opportunity to exert authority in the
publicity surrounding sizeable investor losses, regardless of the juris-
dictional fit. 6 ' While the CFTC may think otherwise, swap
counterparties do not need the CEA nor the CFTC to assert claims for
breach or fraud in a swap transaction: such misconduct is clearly ac-
tionable under contract law and common-law fraud. 69
Although it is even less plausible to consider swaps to be securi-
ties than it is to identify them as futures contracts, the SEC has as-
serted its authority as well. In ajointly negotiated settlement with the
aforementioned CFTC action, the SEC brought an enforcement ac-
tion against Bankers Trust's swap subsidiary (a registered securities
broker) for securities fraud in its dealings with Gibson, on the ground
that options in interest rate swaps are securities.17 °
The SEC's release does not provide any specific basis for this find-
ing. Indeed, the release is internally incoherent. In particular, it
notes SEC rules that exempt government securities, and options
thereon, such as the embedded options in Gibson's contracts. Even
without this exemption, swaps are not securities under the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Among other criteria, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the definition of a security that is an investment contract re-
quires that the parties participate in a common enterprise for profit,
and exempts instruments subject to alternative schemes of federal reg-
ulation, such as products sold by banks. 7' Moreover, as already dis-
cussed, in jurisdictional battles between the CFTC and the SEC, the
courts have rejected the SEC's assertion ofjurisdiction when an instru-
ment has both commodity and security components. Although it is
unlikely that the SEC's power grab will stand up in court, until a de-
fendant appears who is unwilling to settle or the CFTC becomes more
vigorous in maintaining its exclusive jurisdiction than it has been his-
torically, the SEC will continue to seek to expand its reach over off-
168. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC action taken
against Metallgesellschaft). Other commentators share this view. See, e.g., Merton H.
Miller & Christopher L. Culp, Rein in the CFTC, WALL ST.J., Aug. 17, 1995, atA10 (asserting
that Congress needs to reign in the CFTC because the agency is exceeding its granted
authority).
169. See infra note 172.
170. In re BT Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7124, 34-35136, 1994 SEC
LEXIS 4041, at *1 (Dec. 22, 1994).
171. See, e.g., SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551, 555 n.3 (1982); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990).
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exchange derivatives, an arena lacking futures exchanges to police the
SEC's activity.
The exemption of swaps from CFTC jurisdiction leaves such
products unregulated by the federal government. As straightforward
contracts, swaps are simply governed by the law of the jurisdiction
specified in the contract, typically, the State of New York or the
United Kingdom. These jurisdictions are chosen because they are the
locations of the major dealers and they have a relatively developed
and stable body of commercial law.' 72 This does not, however, leave
the market participants unregulated by the federal government. The
major players in swaps are commercial banks, whose activities are
heavily regulated by federal banking agencies. 7 It should be noted
that this is the same approach Congress took with respect to the for-
eign exchange market in the Treasury amendment.
Banking regulators use three principal tools of control: examina-
tions, reporting requirements, and capital requirements. All banks
are subject to an annual examination process, which for the largest
banks is a continuous on-site examination. Among other items, the
examination entails a review of a bank's practices and policies toward
risk management and derivatives use. If an examiner believes that a
bank's activities in derivatives are inadequately or imprudently under-
stood or controlled, he can deem the activity an "unsound" banking
practice and prohibit it. Bank examiner manuals and agency memo-
randa provide detailed instructions concerning appropriate proce-
dures regarding derivatives. These include guidelines requiring
senior management approval and oversight of derivative transactions,
the segregation of functions so that individuals responsible for mea-
suring risk exposure are independent of those who create the expo-
sure, and the credit authorization staff's independence from trading
personnel.174 Reporting requirements compel banks to provide infor-
172. Gibson Greetings did not need the federal securities laws or commodities laws for
legal recourse against Bankers Trust, even though it pled such allegations in its civil com-
plaint, as contract law and common-law fraud certainly applied (and were pendant claims
in the federal case). After discovery of the tapes, the case settled with Bankers' Trust for-
giving approximately $14 million (70%) of the $20.7 million Gibson owed under its con-
tracts. Michael Quint, Gibson Suit on Trades Is Settled N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at DI.
173. A particular bank's regulator depends on the bank's corporate status. The Federal
Reserve Board regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System, bank holding companies, and nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates state banks that are not members of
the Federal Reserve System. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulates na-
tional banks.
174. E.g., BOARD Or GovERNORs, FEDERAL RESERVE SYS., SR 93-69, ExAMINING RISK MAN-
AGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING AcTivrriEs OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
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mation regarding their total derivatives positions-measured by no-
tional amount, product type, and total gross replacement cost-in
their quarterly reports.
Regulators also require banks dealing in derivatives to inform cus-
tomers if a product is unsuitable for them, and to keep a record of
information provided to a customer who, after being so informed, in-
sists on undertaking the transaction. In particular, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) requires banks dealing in deriva-
tives to ensure that their sales and trading personnel "sufficiently un-
derstand derivatives" to be able to identify situations when a customer
may not fully understand a transaction's risks. The agency further re-
quires that a bank's credit officers understand the applicability of a
particular transaction to the risks the customer is trying to manage.
Where a bank believes a transaction may not be appropriate for a cus-
tomer, but the customer wishes to proceed, regulations require the
bank to document its analysis and the information provided to the
customer. 75 The OCC distinguishes this responsibility to assess the
appropriateness of a transaction for a customer from the suitability
requirements of securities dealers because unlike the dealer, the bank
is not prohibited from carrying out the transaction, but simply must
document that it informed the customer of the product's unsuitabil-
ity. 76 Of the estimated ten commercial banks that are swap dealers,
six are supervised by the OCC.177
In addition, banking regulators supplement their examination
and reporting review of derivatives dealers with sanctions for miscon-
duct. The Federal Reserve Board, in what is considered a severe disci-
plinary procedure, entered into a "written agreement" with Bankers
Trust after the bank was sued by Gibson and other corporate custom-
ers who had experienced substantial losses on complex leveraged
swaps, shortly before the CFTC and SEC settlements with the bank.17
The agreement required the bank to provide increased information
(Dec. 20, 1993), reprinted in Safety and Soundness Issues Related to Bank Derivatives Activities-
Part 2: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 767-81 (1993) [hereinafter Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 2].
175. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR BC-277, RISK MANAGEMENT OF
FINANcIAL DERIVATIVES 6 (OcL 27, 1993) [hereinafter BANKING CIRCULAR], reprinted in Safety
and Soundness Issues Related to Bank Derivatives Activities-Part 1: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 690, 696 (1993) [herein-
after Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 1].
176. BankDerivativesActivitiesHearing-Part 1, supra note 175, at 713 (documenting OCC's
responses to questions posed by Rep. Baker during the hearing on Oct. 28, 1993).
177. Id. at 422 (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency).
178. Written Agreement by and Among Bankers Trust New York Corp. et al. and Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, Docket Nos. 94-082-WA/RB-HC et al., at 5 (Dec. 1994).
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to specified swap customers, including daily valuation of contracts. 179
In all likelihood, the agreement will, in due course, become the stan-
dard for dealer conduct.
The third tool of banking regulators, capital requirements, is in-
tended to guard against excessive risk-taking and thereby to protect
federal deposit insurance funds, by ensuring that banks maintain ade-
quate reserves.18 1 Under the capital requirements, banks must meet a
specified leverage ratio based on the ratio of a bank's core capital,
which includes common stock, retained earnings, and perpetual pre-
ferred stock, to total assets. The required ratio is between three to
four percent, depending on the bank's relative safety and soundness
rating. 181
Following an international agreement known as the 1988 Basle
Accord, the product of negotiations through the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS), U.S. banking regulators, along with their
counterparts in other nations, implemented risk-based capital require-
ments, supplementing the leverage-ratio requirement, that include
reserves for off-balance-sheet instruments, including swaps. This
agreement came into full force in 1992.82 Under the Basle capital
requirements, banks must hold reserves based on the credit risk of
their positions, that is, the risk of counterparty default. 18 3
179. The requirements pertain to "leveraged derivatives," whose payment formulas are
leveraged such that results are dramatically magnified when interest rates shift. The agree-
ment also required Bankers Trust to develop an oversight plan of personnel handling its
leveraged derivatives business that ensures senior management is fully informed of the
bank's exposure from such activity. Id. at 7-8.
180. See genera//yJONATHAN P- MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULA-
TION 284 (1992).
181. See id. at 285; see also infra note 183.
182. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 180, at 286.
183. Bank capital is divided into two tiers. Tier one represents core capital, consisting of
common stock, certain noncumulative preferred stock, and minority equity interests in
subsidiaries. Id. Tier two capital includes preferred stock not included in tier one,
subordinated debt, loan, and lease loss allowances, and certain other hybrid capital instru-
ments. Id. Bank assets are sorted into four risk classes, which are assigned different risk
weights (0, 20, 50, and 100%), and the bank must have capital equal to 8% of the risk-
weighted sum of its assets. Because tier two capital may not exceed tier one capital, the
requirement of an 8% capital-to-risk adjusted assets ratio also imposes a 4% tier one capital
requirement. Id. For derivative instruments, banks must hold the specified amount of
capital (8%) against the risk-weighted "credit equivalent amount" of their over-the-counter
derivative positions (swaps and swaptions). Futures contracts are not included in the risk-
adjusted capital calculation (they are assigned a risk weight of 0%) because they are con-
sidered default-free due to the clearinghouse arrangement that guarantees counterparty
performance. Credit equivalent amounts for swaps consist of two parts: (1) present expo-
sure, which is measured by the marked-to-market value of the contract and is equal to the
replacement cost were the counterparty to default on its obligations; and (2) potential
future exposure, which is calculated by multiplying the contract's notional amount by a
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Bank assets and liabilities are subject to additional types of risk
besides credit risk. In late 1993, responding to a congressional direc-
tive that arose from concern that price risk is as important as credit
risk for banks' financial condition, U.S. banking regulators proposed
capital standards that incorporate interest rate risk.1 84 The proposal
sought public comment on two alternative approaches: either a mini-
mum charge on interest rate risk exposure above a threshold amount,
or a risk-assessment method calling for a capital charge on a case-by-
case basis."a 5 At the same time, the BIS proposed that market (price)
risk be incorporated into capital standards. As with the existing capi-
tal requirements that incorporate credit risk, the proposed rules
would apply to all bank investments and not solely to derivative
instruments.
While there is substantial oversight of banks engaging in off-ex-
change derivative activity, not all swap dealers are banks, and nonbank
dealers may not be subject to any regulation. If a broker-dealer who is
registered with the SEC to sell securities, or a futures commission
merchant who is registered with the CFTC to sell futures, were to deal
in swaps, the activity would be subject to those agencies' respective
regulatory regimes because the dealer is so regulated. However, se-
curities firms that are active in swaps undertake their swap business in
separately incorporated subsidiaries, and these entities need not be
registered with the SEC because they are not trading regulated prod-
ucts (securities).186
The principal reason for separate incorporation of a swap subsidi-
ary is to obtain a AAA credit rating. The subsidiary is provided with
sufficient capital, insulated from the parent for insolvency purposes,
and required to minimize its risk by matching all of its swap transac-
tions to obtain the highest credit rating. Securities firms devised this
structure in order to compete with the better capitalized banks, which,
factor from 0 to 5%, depending on the contract type (interest rate swaps have a lower
weight than currency swaps, and contracts maturing in less than a year have a lower weight
than those with more than one year to maturity). The credit equivalent amount derived
from these two parts is then multiplied by a risk weight, ranging from 0 to 50%. The risk
weight to be applied is dependent upon the creditworthiness of the counterparty. See Fed-
eral Reserve Board, Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A, and 12 C.F.R.
pt. 225 apps. A, B, reprinted in Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 2, supra note 174, at
785-847.
184. See Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 3, supra note 110, at 765-66.
185. Id.
186. In order not to disrupt the swap market, simultaneous with its Bankers Trust ac-
tion, the SEC issued an order exempting swap brokers and dealers from registration as
securities broker-dealers, to the extent their instruments (options in swaps) were securities.
SEC Release No. 34-35135 (Dec. 22, 1994).
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unlike securities firms, have the highest credit ratings. A high credit
rating is essential because, as has been emphasized, counterparty
creditworthiness is a key market consideration.
There is, however, another reason for securities firms to use an
unregistered affiliate for their swap business: avoiding the severe capi-
tal requirements the SEC imposes on derivative holdings. The SEC's
capital requirements are intended to ensure that broker-dealers have
sufficient liquid assets to satisfy obligations to customers and other
broker-dealers and to provide a cushion against losses from market or
credit risk. These rules were formulated prior to the development of
the swap market and treat non-exchange-traded derivatives as un-
secured receivables subject to a 100% capital charge. This is substan-
tially higher than the risk-adjusted capital charge imposed on banks.
Initially, the SEC rules did not create difficulties for broker-dealers
because unsecured extension of credit was not a significant segment
of their business. It is for swaps. In order to bring swap operations
back inside the regulatory framework, the SEC has proposed a menu
of changes to its capital requirements for derivative products. Some
of the proposals would create requirements similar to those imposed
by banking regulators on banks.
Although the SEC cannot control the operations of unregistered
swap subsidiaries, it does obtain some information about the scope of
their operation. Registered securities brokerage firms, the unregu-
lated firms' parent corporations, are required to provide information
about affiliates' activities that "are likely to have a material impact" on
the broker's financial condition."'7 They must also report on their
systems for monitoring and controlling risks arising from affiliates' op-
erations."' The leading brokerage firms voluntarily agreed to pro-
vide position and risk model information to the SEC and to adopt
internal controls for their unregistered affiliates.' 9
A final category of swap dealer not subject to any federal regula-
tion consists of insurance companies and their affiliates. While the
largest players in swaps are international banks, followed by securities
firm affiliates, a few large insurance companies have also created sepa-
187. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17h-IT to -2T (1995) (adopting SEC risk-assessment rules pursu-
ant to the Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 978); see also Bank
Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 3, supra note 110, at 439-40 (1993) (SEC staff submission to
Rep. Leach).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-2T.
189. Saul Hansel, Firms Agree to Regulatoty Review of Derivatives Units, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1995, at D4.
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rate entities to deal in swaps.190 Insurance companies are subject to
state regulation in the states where they are domiciled or licensed to
do business. State insurance departments, however, do not exercise
control over affiliated firms not engaged in the insurance business,
and as a result, such affiliates are not subject to capital requirements
and their reporting requirements are minimal.19 1 They do, however,
hold capital against their exposure, 92 as would be expected in a mar-
ket where creditworthiness is important.
The General Accounting Office recommended that the unregu-
lated derivatives activity of the affiliates of insurance companies and
securities firms be brought under the regulatory authority of the
SEC.' 9 3 But while there is a good reason to ensure that bank involve-
ment in risky instruments does not go unregulated-protection of the
federal deposit insurance fund-this motivation does not apply to
non-bank institutions. 194 Furthermore, even for banks, there is no evi-
dence that more regulation is needed to protect the deposit fund be-
yond existing capital requirements. A recent study of bank derivatives
activities found a positive correlation between capitalization and deriv-
atives usage, suggesting that current regulations sufficiently prevent
moral hazard problems of undercapitalized banks engaging in more
risky activities.19
D. Uses of Swaps
Swaps, like other derivative instruments, serve a risk-management
function. Interest rate swaps are used to hedge interest rate risks, and
currency swaps hedge foreign exchange rate risk. The example intro-
duced of a commodity swap in which an oil company fixes the price it
will receive for its product illustrates the hedging use of such swaps.1 96
Because futures contracts exist for the risks being swapped, a natural
question is why use a swap instead? Typically, firms choose swaps over
futures when customization of terms is important.
190. The General Accounting Office identified three insurance companies that have
sizeable over-the-counter derivative dealer affiliates. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 87.
191. Id. at 86.
192. Id. at 91.
193. Id. at 127. Although the CFrC would be the more natural regulator than the SEC,
as swaps are closer to futures than to securities, the GAO views the CFrC as a lax regulator
compared to the SEC.
194. See Financial Economists Roundtable, Statement on Derivatives Markets and Financial
Risk (Sept. 26, 1994).
195. Jeffrey W. Gunther & Thomas F. Siems, The Likelihood and Extent of Bank Partici-
pation in Derivatives Activities, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Financial Industry Studies
Working Paper No. 1-95 (May 1995).
196. See supra p. 52.
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The most common distinguishing term is the contract length.
Futures contracts have short duration, generally lasting for three to six
months, and traded contracts rarely go out beyond a year. Moreover,
contracts with the most extended expiration dates have far less liquid-
ity. To hedge a long-term product commitment in the futures market,
a trader has to engage in what is termed a rolling hedge. Under that
strategy, a near-term futures contract is acquired and, as soon as it is
about to expire, the position is closed out and a new contract is ac-
quired with a later delivery date, thereby extending the hedge forward
ad infinitum. This can be a risky strategy, creating, at the very least,
liquidity risk.197 In one of the better known instances of financial dif-
ficulties caused by derivative trading, the German oil firm,
Metallgesellschaft, A.G., found this out to its dismay. 9 '
In contrast to futures contracts, swap contracts can be written for
as long a period as a counterparty desires. They are typically written
for much longer periods than futures, ranging from two to fifteen
years. While forward contracts also can be combined to replicate the
longer term of swap contracts, as earlier noted, swaps are transaction-
ally more efficient contracts.1 99
Financial institutions, such as savings and loans, frequently have
mismatched asset and liability durations.200 They lend at fixed rates
for the long term (mortgages), but they borrow at floating rates over
the short term (deposits). With this balance sheet structure, if short-
term rates rise the institution will lose money. It can hedge the inter-
est rate risk better with a swap than with a futures contract because
futures contracts do not trade out far enough. The savings and loan
takes a long swap position, paying a fixed rate, which it covers with the
fixed rate it receives from the mortgagees. It receives floating-rate
payments, which it uses to cover its floating liabilities to depositors.
Financial institutions are, in fact, among the most frequent users of
interest rate swaps.
197. The offsetting cash flows are likely to be mismatched in a rolling hedge. For exam-
ple, if losses are incurred on the futures position, the firm will need to come up with cash
to meet margin calls, while it might not yet have received the profits from its positive-
valued longer term spot positions.
198. Culp & Hanke, supra note 14 (describing $1.35 billion loss sustained on futures
contracts when firm could not meet margin calls and continue rolling hedge forward).
199. F~aozzi & MODILIANI, supra note 38, at 648.
200. Duration is a measure of a debt instrument's sensitivity to interest rate changes.
Technically, it measures "how long, on average, the holder... waits before receiving cash
payments" for small changes in the yield curve. HULL, SUpra note 44, at 99-100. In situa-
tions where all interest rates change by the same amount, the percentage change in a
bond's price equals its duration, multiplied by the size of the shift in the yield curve. Id.
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In a usage closely related to the hedging function, swaps can
change a firm's asset or liability characteristics. A corporation that has
borrowed funds at a floating rate can change its floating-rate obliga-
tion into fixed-rate debt by assuming a long swap position (fixed
payer). The floating-rate payments it receives in the swap offset the
floating interest it owes on the loan. Thus, its net payout is a fixed
payment, the swap cash flows. The corporation has thereby changed
the nature of its liabilities from floating- to fixed-rate obligations by
entering into the swap. The use of a swap by a savings and loan insti-
tution to alleviate balance sheet duration mismatch is a liability swap.
Swaps can also be used to make adjustments on the asset side of
the balance sheet. For example, insurance companies sell guaranteed
investment contracts (GICs) to pension funds. These contracts com-
mit the insurer to paying a fixed rate of return to the fund over several
years. The insurers' investments, which must cover their GIC obliga-
tions, are typically made at floating rates. If the floating rate declines,
the insurance company may not be able to cover its GIC obligation. It
can protect against this risk by entering into a swap in which it pays
floating and receives fixed rates. The fixed-rate payment is sufficient
to cover its GIC obligations, while its investment earnings cover its
floating swap payments. There will typically be a differential in pay-
ments made and received that enables the insurance company to lock
in a specified spread, say 100 basis points, across the transactions.
The development of variants on plain vanilla swaps reflects the
hedging and balance sheet management needs of participants. For
example, forward swaps work like anticipatory hedges. Amortizing
swaps better meet the requirements of counterparties matching mort-
gages or other financing projects with payment schedules that change
as loans are prepaid. Swaps used in this fashion can be viewed as a
mechanism by which banks can better serve customers. Many home-
owners, for instance, prefer thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages to adjust-
able-rate mortgages or shorter fifteen-year, fixed-rate loans. These
preferred long-term instruments, however, impose a greater interest
rate risk on banks than the short-term instruments. By entering into a
swap, the bank transfers that risk to the swap counterparty, and is thus
able to provide borrowers with the loan terms they desire. Amortizing
swaps also have a regulatory avoidance purpose. The capital require-
ments for swaps are much lower than those for the underlying securi-
ties (calculated at .5% of the notional amount versus 50% of principal
value). Hence, banks entering into such swaps can achieve, at a lower
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capital cost, the returns from mortgage securities that they otherwise
would have purchased. °1
The reconfiguration of liabilities through swap agreements sug-
gests an explanation for swaps that was initially quite popular, but is
now largely discredited, the quality spread differential (QSD), which is
based on the concept of comparative advantage.20 2 According to this
explanation, high-quality firms are offered lower fixed rates for long-
term borrowing than low-quality firms, because they present lenders
with a lower risk of repayment default. In the floating-rate short-term
borrowing market, although high-quality firms will still be offered bet-
ter rates than low-quality ones, the differential is less because the risk
of default is less (the duration of the loan is shorter, and refinancing
is thus done at current rates or is not done at all). Hence, there are
gains from trade to be shared. Low-quality firms borrow in the short-
term floating-rate market, and high-quality firms borrow in the long-
term fixed-rate market. They then enter into swaps that exchange
payment streams, enabling the firms to borrow in the form they pre-
fer, regardless of their comparative advantages, at a rate reduced by
the amount of the QSD.
While the explanation is a familiar economic argument, it has
fallen into disrepute in the swap context because it is premised on a
persistent inefficiency in capital markets.20 ' That is, once the swap
market developed depth, arbitrage should eliminate credit-market dif-
ferences. Although there is evidence, as arbitrage arguments predict,
that QSDs have declined as swap usage has increased, the market for
swaps has continued to expand despite the decrease in spreads. °4
201. ChristopherJames & Clifford Smith, The Use of Index Amortizing Swaps by Banc One, 7
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 54, 55-56 (Fall 1994). James and Smith contend that the regulatory
benefit was well known and was the reason for these instruments' widespread use. Id. at 58.
202. Larry D. Wall & John J. Pringle, Alternative Explanations of Interest Rate Swaps: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 18 FIN. MGMirr. 59, 60 (Summer 1989).
203. Some commentators maintain that QSDs are not arbitrageable, and hence the QSD
benefit from a swap is illusory. Id. Whether they are correct depends on the source of the
QSD. Id. For instance, if the source of the QSD has to do with default risk, then it is not
arbitrageable. In other words, the higher QSD in the fixed-rate market evidences the view
that the low-credit borrower's risk of bankruptcy increases over time. The long-term
lender must take this risk into account at the start of its contract because the rate will not
be adjusted later. The short-term creditor does not need to do so because it can adjust the
interest rate over time for increases in default risk, and hence the QSD is lower in the
short-term market. If the swap is done directly between the counterpardes without a
dealer, then the high-quality credit counterparty's interest savings is more apparent than
real, because, in this scenario, the savings are compensation for the risk that the low-quality
credit counterparty will default.
204. James Bicksler & Andrew H. Chen, An Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps, 41J.
FIN. 645, 649 (1986).
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Alternative explanations to the comparative-advantage thesis are
based on the view that swaps lower financing costs. These arguments
involve informational asymmetries, that managers know more about
the firm than can be revealed to third parties. For example, where
management believes its financial condition, and hence its credit
quality, will improve beyond current ratings, a swap will let it hedge
against interest rate risk while avoiding an "excessively" high fixed-rate
quality-spread premium (that is, management speculates on its own
QSD in the short-term market).205 At the same time, the swap may
make it more difficult for management to increase the firm's risk at
the expense of creditors, because by taking on short-term debt financ-
ing, incentives are reduced to shift risk after credit is extended.2"6
As with other derivatives, swaps also can be used for investment
purposes. Equity swaps, for instance, enable the purchaser to obtain
the returns on an equity portfolio without having to undertake a di-
rect investment in the securities. This is particularly attractive to U.S.
investors when the swap is linked to the performance of a foreign eq-
uity index, such as the Nikkei-225 or Japan TOPIX. This is because
the trading costs for foreign stocks are much higher than those for
U.S. domestic shares, and the swap further avoids foreign exchange
transactions.207
V. MORTGAGE-BASED DERIVATIVES
Although swaps and over-the-counter options are the derivative
instruments that have attracted the greatest attention from regulators
fearing a possible financial catastrophe, some of the largest investor
losses recently have involved mortgage-based securities and their de-
rivatives. 20 8 Given past experience-significant losses tend to attract
legislative inquiries-these instruments can be expected to draw con-
gressional attention, along with swaps and off-exchange options, in
coming sessions. Thus, this Article briefly reviews mortgage-based de-
rivatives, despite their absence from reformers' current focus.
2 9
An important innovation in the capital markets in the 1970s and
1980s was the securitization of residential mortgages. The develop-
205. Anatoli Kuprianov, The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in Corporate Finance, 80/3 FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 49, 62 (1994).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., DAs, supra note 128, at 542.
208. See, e.g., Kuprianov, supra note 205, at 49; see also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying
text.
209. The 1994 study on financial derivatives by the General Accounting Office, for ex-
ample, excluded mortgage-based instruments from its scope. GAO REPORT, supra note 11,
at 32.
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ment of securitized mortgages countered a problem of disintermedia-
tion (shortfalls in funds available to depositary institutions to finance
mortgage lending), which was due to the increase in inflation and
interest rates in the late 1960s, in conjunction with federal ceilings on
mortgage rates.
210
In the simplest securitized (also termed structured) financing,
residential mortgages are pooled and placed in a trust, and securities
backed by the pool of loans are sold to investors. The securities,
which represent shares in the trust, are referred to as "pass-through"
securities because the interest and principal payments on the underly-
ing mortgages are passed through to the investors who purchase the
securities. They are also referred to as mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs). Most pass-through securities are guaranteed by federal agen-
cies, such as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac),
and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Con-
gress created these agencies, whose mortgages constitute the securi-
tized pools, to support an active secondary market in mortgages in
order to reduce interest rates paid by homeowners.2 '
Mortgage instruments are unique among debt obligations be-
cause of a special option feature that provides homeowners the right
to prepay mortgages without penalty. The prepayment option makes
the maturity of mortgage securities uncertain. When interest rates
drop, homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages refinance to take advan-
tage of the lower rates. Investors in mortgages then find that they are
paid off earlier than they expected, at exactly the time when it is least
desirable, as they must reinvest at lower market rates. This is referred
to as contraction risk. When interest rates rise, refinancing activity
slows, and as fewer loans are paid off early, principal repayments are
not accelerated. This occurs precisely when investors would want to
receive their investment back in order to be able to reinvest at the
higher market rates. This is referred to as extension risk. Pass-
through securities therefore present substantial risk from the prepay-
ment option, which decreases their value to investors.
An innovation in mortgage securities directed at reducing pre-
payment risk is the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO). CMOs
repackage the cash flows from a securitized mortgage pool into classes
of interests with specified maturities. CMOs derive their cash flow
from the underlying mortgages and therefore can be considered de-
210. See FABozzi & MODIGLIANI, supra note 38, at 568-69.
211. Id. at 570-71.
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rivative securities. They are not, however, derivative securities in the
sense of forward, futures, or option contracts, which set prices today
for future obligations but do not transfer any rights in the asset or its
cash flows until the contract's expiration date. Derivatives are con-
tracts to purchase assets or securities (or to provide a payoff based on
an interest rate or stock index) in the future, whereas mortgage deriv-
atives are themselves securities. Although their payoffs are indeed de-
rived from another instrument, the underlying mortgage, CMOs are
in fact an immediate transfer of rights to promised payments (the re-
packaged mortgage's cash flows), and hence are in standard taxon-
omy a security rather than any generic derivative.
The standard CMO is divided into four classes or "tranches" of
securities with different maturities. The first three tranches (A, B, and
) in a generic CMO receive periodic interest payments from the un-
derlying mortgages, while scheduled principal payments and prepay-
ments are applied sequentially. The payments are first used to retire
tranche A, and after tranche A is retired in full, to retire tranche B,
and so forth. The fourth tranche, the Z-bond, receives no payments
of interest or principal until the other three tranches are paid off in
full. Investors concerned about prepayment risk can purchase securi-
ties of the first three tranches and thereby better specify the maturity
of their investment. A CMO does not, however, eliminate uncertainty;
it merely redistributes it. The payoff uncertainty that has been re-
duced for the A, B, and C tranche investors has been shifted to the Z-
bond holders, who therefore are subject to greater risk than a direct
holder of the underlying mortgages.
The CMO structure serves two functions. In addition to redistrib-
uting repayment risk, it enables issuers to provide a wide range of ma-
turities, of a short-term or intermediate length, compared to the term
of the actual mortgages. This is accomplished through the tranches'
different principal repayment priorities. Thus, the CMO structure ex-
pands the classes of investors interested in the instruments. For exam-
ple, Z-bonds tend to be purchased by pension funds, life insurance
companies, and other investors seeking to lengthen the duration of
their asset portfolios so as to reduce reinvestment risk. The Z-bond's
cash flow is well-suited to matching their long-term liabilities because
it starts off as a zero coupon bond, paying nothing while the other
tranches are being retired.2" Other investors, seeking greater secur-
ity of payouts, are attracted to the A, B, and C tranches.
212. Linda Lowell & Bruce Mahood, Z-Bonds, in HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SE-
cu'rmEs 433 (FrankJ. Fabozzi ed., 3d ed. 1992).
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Some CMOs issue what are known as PAC or TAC bonds
(planned and targeted amortization classes). These instruments are
classes of bonds with specified schedules of retirement, similar to a
bond sinking fund, that stabilize prepayment risk even further by pro-
viding fixed-range prepayment schedules that offer greater certainty
regarding the security's cash flow pattern than standard CMO
tranches. PACs are accompanied by non-PAC or companion bonds
that, correspondingly, bear greater prepayment risk (analogous to the
Z-bonds' position in a conventional CMO). If actual prepayments dif-
fer from the PAC bonds' prepayment schedule, the companion bonds
must absorb the difference so that the PAC bonds' schedule is main-
tained. The companion bonds bear both the contraction and exten-
sion risk.
A further variation on the standard CMO is a floating-rate CMO,
which includes a tranche that receives interest that varies with an in-
dex. To assure that the underlying collateral can meet the floating
obligation, a cap is placed on the maximum interest that can be paid
on the floating-rate class. Floating-rate CMOs are also typically accom-
panied by inverse-floater CMOs, securities that have coupon rates that
move in the opposite direction of the index- or floating-rate bonds. If
interest rates fall, the rate paid on an inverse floater increases. The
CMO with a floating class and inverse floater is structured such that
the two tranches' payouts offset each other to produce a fixed return
that can be sustained by the underlying mortgages.
CMOs were immensely popular upon their introduction in 1986,
and the market grew at a rapid clip from $48 billion in 1986 to $118.6
billion in 1990.213 Declining interest rates in the early 1990s made
inverse floaters a very desirable product. As interest rates rose rapidly
in 1994, investors in these instruments took substantial losses and the
market for new issues dried up so substantially that it adversely af-
fected the profitability of the major CMO dealers.214
Stripped mortgage-backed securities (SMBSs), introduced by
Fannie Mae in 1987, are another major development in securitized
financing. SMBSs divide the cash flow of the underlying mortgages
into unequal distributions of interest and principal components, in-
terest-only securities (1Os), and principal-only securities (POs). As
payments are made on the underlying mortgages, 10 security holders
receive the interest payments and PO security holders receive the
213. F.aoZZm & MODIGLMI, supra note 38, at 586.
214. Michael Siconolfi & Fred Vogelstein, Mortgage Woes Shake Bear Unit, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 5, 1995, at Cl.
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principal payments. POs are issued at substantial discounts, and the
yield that investors receive depends on the actual prepayment rate.
Changes in interest rates affect 10 and PO securities differently. For
example, an 10 investment will decrease in value when interest rates
decline. As the underlying mortgages are paid off, the interest pay-
ments cease, as does the cash flow of the 10. A PO will decrease in
value as interest rates rise. As prepayments cease, the PO's cash flow
deteriorates and it takes a longer time to recover principal payments.
1Os and POs are riskier investments than straight pass-through
securities.
CMOs can be issued with 10 and PO classes. These are called
super IOs and super POs because of their substantial volatility. Hold-
ing both the 10 and PO of an issue is not a perfect hedge. As some
investors learned the hard way, although 10 and PO securities move
in opposite directions with changes in interest rates, they do not move
symmetrically. 15 Therefore, as with option-hedging, 1O-PO portfolios
have to be continuously adjusted.
CMOs and their many variants are not federally regulated. They
are not subject to CFTC regulation because they are not futures con-
tracts, and they are generally exempt from SEC regulation under the
statutory exemption for securities issued or guaranteed by govern-
mental entities and banks. It is somewhat inaccurate to view these
product markets as free from federal oversight because banks are
among the most active consumers of CMO products, and financial in-
stitutions' holding of MBSs is constrained by federal capital require-
ments and regulatory rulings.
For example, MBSs issued by Ginnie Mae have no risk weight,
whereas Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBSs and agency-backed
CMOs have a risk weight of 20%. SMBSs (IOs and POs) have 100%
weights. As noted earlier, higher risk weight assets require banks to
hold greater capital reserves than low-risk weight assets, discouraging
banks from using them. Furthermore, high-risk CMO tranches, such
as Z-bonds and inverse floaters, and SMBSs, are considered unsuitable
securities for depositary institutions. They may be held only for spe-
cific, documented hedging purposes or if they meet certain stress tests
based on the instrument's average life and price sensitivity under spec-
ified interest rate shifts. Banks must monitor such hedges and remove
them if they are not working. These rules limit banks' holdings of the
215. See Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu, The Risks of Mortgage Backed Securities and Their
Derivatives, 7J. AJPUED Cor,. FIN. 99, 104-06 (Fall 1994). Investors who found that their
1O or PO losses exceeded their PO or 10 gains include the Louisiana Pension Fund and
Glaxo Holdings. Id. at 104.
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riskier MBSs. Many of the big losers in CMO investments were, in
fact, not financial institutions, and thus were not similarly con-
strained. But as is true with the differential regulation of swap dealers,
there is a distinct federal interest in banks, the federal deposit insur-
ance fund, compared to other CMO end-users.
CMOs can be used for risk management. In particular, SMBSs
are used to hedge portfolios of MBSs.21 6 Because stripped securities
have much higher absolute effective durations than pass-throughs
(that is, their prices are much more sensitive to interest rate changes),
investors can reduce their mortgage portfolios' sensitivity to interest
rates by establishing small positions in SMBSs. Financial institutions
with balance sheet mismatches such that their asset duration exceeds
their liability duration, can purchase 1Os to reduce their interest rate
exposure. The 1Os will rise in value when interest rates rise and their
assets' value decreases. Moreover, 1Os have a negative duration,
which shortens the duration of the combined portfolio. Thrifts and
mortgage bankers use POs to hedge servicing portfolios (fees earned
for servicing the mortgages underlying a pass-through structure have
the same duration attributes as 1Os). When interest rates decline and
principal is paid down more quickly, servicing income decreases while
the POs increase in value. In addition, SMBSs can be used to reduce a
mortgage portfolio's prepayment risk because they react inversely to
changes in prepayment rates. 1Os counterbalance discount pass-
through securities while POs counterbalance premium pass-
throughs.217
Finally, SMBSs are used to create synthetic pass-through securities
with risk and return characteristics more desirable to investors than a
simple pass-through instrument. For example, floating-rate CMOs are
used by financial institutions and other investors seeking investments
whose returns vary with the rate paid on their liabilities. Such CMOs
have been structured to attract investors who otherwise would acquire
another type of short-term, floating-rate investment.
216. SMBSs provide a better hedge than a Treasury security because cross-hedging in-
volves basis risk.
217. Premium instruments, those with coupons higher than market rates, decrease in
value as prepayments increase, while POs do not; whereas IOs balance the slow-down in
prepayment rates for discount instruments, those with coupons lower than market rates.
See Steven J. Carlson & Timothy D. Sears, Stripped Mortgage Pass-Throughs: New Tools for
Investors, in HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECUmrS 553, 566-70 (FrankJ. Fabozzi ed.,
rev. ed. 1988).
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VI. STRUCTURED NoTEs
Like mortgage-backed securities, structured notes are not truly
derivatives. They are debt securities with derivative features; the
debt's yield is pegged to the contingent value of another asset, rate, or
index. Because of this dual nature, structured notes are often re-
ferred to as hybrid securities.
Structured notes were first introduced in 1990. The market has
grown rapidly as institutional investors have sought mechanisms to in-
crease returns in a period of declining yields. The notes are issued by
high-quality credit institutions such as governmental entities, banks,
and corporations, thus accounting for their desirable capital standard
risk weights. The notes come in many varieties, most often as a cus-
tomized issue sold entirely to one institutional investor. Generic vari-
eties include:2" 8 (1) inverse floating-rate notes, notes whose coupon
increases as a specified interest rate decreases; (2) index amortizing
notes, fixed-rate notes whose face declines prior to maturity depend-
ing on the level of a specified interest rate; (3) synthetic convertible
notes, notes with low fixed-rate coupons and an option on the per-
formance of an equity index or specific stock, such that the note pays
a minimum par upon redemption plus an additional amount if the
index or stock is above a specified level at maturity;219 (4) interest
differential notes, notes with variable coupons and fixed redemption
amounts or fixed coupons and varying principal, whose non-fixed
components vary with the level of specified reference rates involving
rate differentials across currencies or across maturities within one
currencyY2
0
The common feature of these diverse instruments is that inves-
tors preserve their capital by purchasing a debt instrument, but do not
give up the possibility of upside returns because of the security's con-
tingent return component. The high credit rating of the issuer en-
sures that principal will be repaid at maturity at the same time that the
investor's return depends on the success of its bet on future interest
rates, equity prices, or the spread between domestic and foreign inter-
est rates. The structured note issuer hedges its contingent coupon
218. For a review of the various types of structured notes see ChristopherJ. Williams et
al., Fixed Income Hybrid and Synthetic Securities, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND
SYNTHETCS, supra note 40, at 179.
219. These notes are similar to convertible securities because the investor holds a fixed-
income investment with the possibility of an additional upside return if the equity value
rises above a certain level.
220. These notes create a yield-curve trade without exposure to currency risk. Se-Wil-
liams et al., supra note 218, at 179.
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liability (the aforementioned upside return) by entering into a swap
in which it receives a payment equal to what it must pay out on the
note.
The futures or commodity-like component of structured notes
could subject them to CFTC regulation, although their issuance by
banks would appear to implicate the Treasury amendment. This is
also true despite the notes' securities (debt) characteristics, which
otherwise place them within the SEC's jurisdiction because, as previ-
ously discussed, courts hold the CFTC's regulation is exclusive when-
ever an instrument has a futures-like feature." 1 The CFTC, in fact,
issued a tentative release proposing to regulate these instruments in
1987. 2 This contributed to the jurisdictional battle across federal
agencies previously noted in conjunction with the CFTC's parallel ef-
fort to regulate commodity swaps.22 As a result, the 1992 legislation
directed the CFTC to examine hybrids as well as swaps under its new
exemptive power. The CFTC promptly did so, and established a fifty
percent test for exclusion. 2 4 Hybrids possessing a securities compo-
nent of more than fifty percent of the instrument's value, and there-
fore a futures component of less than fifty percent of the value, are
exempted from CFTC regulation.225 This does not leave all such
products unregulated. With the elimination of CEA exclusivity, the
SEC can regulate the notes as securities. Most structured notes are
exempted from SEC regulation by statute, however, because they are
issued or guaranteed by governmental entities and banks.2 6
It should be noted that the regulatory system governing securities
is a very different regime from the derivatives regulation administered
by the CFTC. Securities must be registered with the SEC before they
can be publicly traded. But while the CFTC must approve new con-
tracts under a public interest formulation for them to be traded,22 7
the SEC does not engage in a merit review of securities. The SEC
must register the security as long as the selling material (the prospec-
tus) meets its disclosure requirements. 228 The governing regulatory
221. E.g., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
222. CFTC Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning the Regulation of
Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (1987).
223. See supra part IV.C.
224. CFTC Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. pt. 34 (1995).
225. Id.
226. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 78c(a)(12) (A), (42) (1994).
227. 7 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1994).
228. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77h.
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principle is that "sunshine" is a "disinfectant."22 a The view is that if a
prospectus fully discloses the risks of an investment, investors will be
adequately protected. They will not, for example, knowingly place
their funds in an investment that is revealed to have extremely high
risk or be subject to insiders' sharp dealing, or they will pay very little
for the investment opportunity. As a consequence, seekers of capital
will refrain from proposing such activities.
Despite the lack of a substantive statutory standard for the regis-
tration of securities, the SEC may take the position that it can prevent
the trading of new derivative products, such as a hybrid security, that
lack an economic purpose, through its authority to approve or deny
rule changes of registered exchanges because proposals to trade new
products, unlike the registration of conventional securities, are ex-
change rules. The former director of market regulation of the SEC
suggested that a product serving "no hedging or other economic func-
tion," that is, a product used solely for speculation, would not meet
the statutory standard for approving an exchange rule, that the rule
be consistent with the purposes of the 1934 Act.2"' His reasoning is
that the benefits to market participants of such a product would be
outweighed by the potential for manipulation, diminished public con-
fidence in markets, and other regulatory concerns, and thus it is in-
consistent with the Act's purposes. 23 1  The extent to which the
Commission adheres to this position and has kept products off the
market for lack of an economic purpose is unknown.
Structured notes are typically used to enhance portfolio yields,
that is, for speculation, rather than for risk management. Inverse
floating-rate notes are purchased by investors with bullish views of
fixed-income markets: they are popular in periods of low inflation
and steep positive yield curves that reflect the market's expectation of
rising rates. 23 2 The investor expects rates to fall-his view is contrary
to the market, for otherwise he could not profit from such an invest-
ment.233 Notes indexed to foreign interest rates and paid in U.S. dol-
lars are sold to investors who are restricted from investing in foreign
securities but have bullish views on foreign markets.2 1 Synthetic con-
229. Justice Brandeis, an ardent supporter of federal securities legislation, articulated
the classic statement of the disclosure rationale: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY 62 (1914).
230. Becker & Bums, supra note 120, at 686 n.32.
231. Id.
232. Williams et al., supra note 218, at 180-81.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 190-92.
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vertible and interest differential notes are attractive to investors with
particular views on market movements. They find these customized
vehicles preferable to futures contracts, as they can fine-tune their
market bets in their own customized issue.
Index-amortizing notes can be compared to CMOs. They have
shorter stated maturities and more well-defined amortization sched-
ules, as they are based on specific interest rate movements rather than
prepayment speeds. For example, such notes might mature in two
years as long as LIBOR is below a specified rate, and extend beyond
two years if LIBOR goes above that rate. CMO maturity dates, in con-
trast, depend on actual prepayment rates. Index-amortizing notes are
most frequently issued by U.S. government agencies and are attractive
to investors when the yield curve is steep, so that the options embed-
ded in the note, altering maturity dates upon certain rates, are valua-
ble compared to holding a straight note.
The speculative character of investments in structured notes be-
comes apparent when the investor's market view proves wrong. Or-
ange County's investment fund purchased several sizeable structured
note issues, and when its bet on a steep yield curve and declining
short-term interest rates proved incorrect, it experienced severe port-
folio losses and filed for bankruptcy. 5 But the speculative character
of the investment, the structured notes, was not the only problem.
Orange County's financial difficulties were compounded by leverage.
It borrowed heavily to follow its investment strategy and when interest
rates turned against it, its losses were correspondingly magnified.2" 6
Although structured notes have not been a focus of legislators' or
regulators' concern, as interest rates rose in 1994 they became the
source of fiscal problems for a number of financial institutions in ad-
dition to Orange County. These institutions acquired the notes be-
cause they had low-risk weights under the capital standards (the
issuers of the notes had low credit risk). This made the notes desira-
ble assets despite their significant market risk. The problem with
structured notes in such cases is not the riskiness of the instruments
per se, but the perverse incentives created by a regulatory regime fo-
cused on credit-risk-based capital standards. Evading capital standards
235. See, e.g., LauraJereski et al., BitterFruit: Orange County, Mired in Investment Mess, Files
for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
236. Id. Orange County used its structured notes as collateral for short-term borrowing
to increase its investment in the notes. As the notes' value dropped, its lenders insisted on
more collateral, and ultimately refused to roll over its loans, forcing the County into bank-
ruptcy. See generally PIILIPPE JOIUON, BIG BETs GONE BAD, DERIVATIVES AND BANKRuPTCY IN
ORANGE CouNwT 32-37 (1995).
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was not, however, a factor in Orange County's bankruptcy filing due
to losses on structured notes (it is not a bank subject to the capital
requirements).
CONCLUSION
If this Article has accomplished its objective, the reader has ac-
quired an appreciation of derivative securities and their institutional
and regulatory environment. The most difficult aspect of derivative
securities, the mathematical formulae by which they are priced, has
not been introduced. This material was omitted because my goal is to
aid the nonprofessional's thinking about regulatory policy, and not
the choice of investments. Such decisions should be made with far
greater economic information than that which can be provided in an
introductory essay offering only an intuitive explanation of the eco-
nomics of derivative instruments. The pricing of derivatives is, how-
ever, quite important. In fact, pricing misunderstandings may well be
where many of the investors listed at this Article's outset have gone
wrong. For example, Procter & Gamble alleged in its lawsuit against
its derivatives dealer, Bankers Trust, that the dealer calculated an op-
tion in a swap contract concerning the interest rate it would pay in a
method different from what Procter & Gamble was told at the out-
set.2" 7 This made the swap value decidedly negative, unbeknownst to
the corporation. In addition, David Askin's hedge fund's bankruptcy
has been attributed, in part, to his incorrect valuation of the fund's
risky CMO investments. 3 8
The question of the transparency of the pricing of off-exchange
derivatives suggests that the regulatory philosophy underlying the se-
curities law, full disclosure, may have an important role to play in the
derivatives context. The level of disclosure concerning derivative
holdings of SEC registrants is a very live topic of regulatory discussion,
as the SEC is proposing more detailed disclosure to be in place for
1996 financial reports.23 9 The recent losses sustained by certain cor-
porations and mutual funds could not have been anticipated by inves-
tors under the present minimal disclosure requirements. Given the
varied forms and uses of derivatives that this Article has summarized,
revising that policy is surely merited. Nevertheless, any disclosure
changes the SEC makes would be an incomplete solution because the
237. Complaint at 2-3, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735 (S.D.
Ohio 1994).
238. Did Dealers Gang Up on David Askin, supra note 1, at 84.
239. 61 Fed. Reg. 578 (1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 239, 240, &
249) (proposedJan. 8, 1996).
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Commission lacks regulatory authority over many market
participants. 24
Although a common reaction to the highly publicized derivatives
losses is to demand increased regulation beyond enhanced disclosure,
there is no evidence that the present regulatory arrangements de-
tailed in this Article contributed substantially to those losses. More
significant contributory factors have been the investors' own poor in-
ternal controls, or greed, which transformed a successful hedging or
moderately risky investment strategy into one of high-risk speculation.
For example, the trader responsible for the demise of Barings was in
charge of his branch's trading and back-office operations, and was not
subject to any position limits.2 14 ' These policies are counter to stan-
dard good management practices that segregate personnel oversight,
bookkeeping, and trading functions and limit each individual
trader's, as well as the entire firm's, exposure. 42 Of course, by ascrib-
ing losses to poor management I do not mean to suggest that there
are no sympathetic victims, such as students of Odessa College or
shareholders of Gibson Greetings, over whose plight the government
might validly be concerned.
But in considering what a regulatory system can or should do
concerning spectacular and sudden investor losses, we must remem-
ber that issue-framing is a key component of the policy process. Wit-
nesses recounting their financial horror stories, such as the small
240. For instance, the SEC regulates municipalities' securities issuance only indirectly,
through its authority over municipal securities underwriters and broker-dealers. It re-
quires underwriters of municipal issues over $1 million to obtain, review, and distribute to
investors, disclosure documents from issuers, but imposes no substantive requirements on
those documents because it has no authority to do so. See Rule 15c2-12, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-26985, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1173, at *1 (June 28, 1989). In addition, in 1994
the SEC prohibited brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers from underwriting
municipal securities where the issuer does not commit to provide ongoing disclosure of
annual financial information and material events, and from recommending municipal se-
curities where the broker-dealer does not have in place procedures to obtain material
event notices from the issuer. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
34-34961, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,590, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3508, at *1 (Nov. 10, 1994) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Again, given the nature of the SEC's authority, the regulation is
indirect. The rule does not, for example, specify the requisite content of the financial
information that must be continuously disclosed and simply requires that the information
in the continuing disclosure correspond to whatever information was provided in the mu-
nicipality's final official statement for the issue.
241. Jeremy Mark et al., Losses at Barings Grow to $1.24 Billion; Authorities Begin Sale of
'Good' Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A3.
242. See, e.g., Working Paper of the Systems, Operations and Controls Subcommittee, in GROUP OF
30, supra note 24, at 66-71 (appropriate internal controls for swap market participants);
BANKING CIRCULAR, supra note 175, at 19-20, reprinted in Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-
Part 1, supra note 175, at 703-04 (appropriate internal controls for banks).
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college or school district that lost everything when an entire endow-
ment was imprudently placed in a risky CMO investment, typically
take precedence in policymakers' deliberations over the testimony of
investors who have benefitted from reduced operating costs by hedg-
ing price risk through derivatives, such as McDonald's savings of 10 to
150 basis points from interest and currency swaps. 24" This is because
public opinion will fixate upon the more vivid event.
Improved internal management controls, rather than improved
disclosure, for end-users, is, in short, the more crucial protective
mechanism because informed insiders will be able to act more quickly
to prevent losses than informed outsiders. Corporate governance is
not, however, an issue within the regulatory authority of the SEC 2 4 or
CFTC (apart from the investment companies and broker-dealers who
must register with these agencies to do business) nor should it be.
The CFTC, in fact, has asserted authority over end-users through the
backdoor. It brought an action against a subsidiary of Metallgesell-
schaft contending that the long-term heating contracts it sold custom-
ers were illegal futures contracts because the contracts were neither
registered nor traded on a designated exchange. 45 The Commis-
sion's objective was not to protect the contract purchasers, as is its
statutory mandate, but rather to impose risk-management practices on
the parent multinational corporation that was not otherwise within its
jurisdiction.246 My view is that the CFTC action was misguided. The
appropriate locus for good-practices guides are trade or industry orga-
nizations, such as the Group of 30, rather than federal agencies, which
are not well positioned to know what is the best practice for a specific
entity. Industry and trade organizations are better attuned to the lat-
est transactions and technologies for evaluating risk. In addition, cor-
porate governance standards are best left to the institutions of state
243. Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 1, supra note 175, at 630-34 (letter from Carle-
ton D. Pearl, Treasurer, McDonald's Corp.).
244. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down rule
imposing exchange-listing requirement of one-share, one-vote, as exceeding SEC's
authority).
245. In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc., No. 95-14, 1995 WL 447455 (Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n July 27, 1995).
246. See id.; Jeffrey Tayor, CFTC Levies Fines Against German Firm, WALL ST. J., July 28,
1995, at C1 ("[T]he most important point is the focus on the lack of internal controls
throughout the organization .... We hope this will teach multinational corporations that
they must have adequate internal controls." (quoting then CFTC Chairman Mary
Schapiro)); Schapiro Stresses Internal Controls in Wake of Fallouts from Derivatives, 27 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1347 (Aug. 11, 1995) ("To argue that the MG message 'concerns off-
exchange activity' ... completely misses the point. ... Rather, MG is an 'internal controls'
case, first and foremost." (quoting then CFTC Chairman, Mary Schapiro)).
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corporate law, which have a far better track record than the federal
government in shareholder protection. 47
Most of the attention in recent policy debates has been on ex-
tending regulation into the unregulated swap market, although the
sizeable losses of Barings and Metallgesellschaft in regulated futures
markets may alter that focus. The institutional features of this market,
reviewed in this Article, have certain investor safeguards that, ironi-
cally, might be dissipated by greater regulation. For example, the ab-
sence of a clearinghouse in the off-exchange market provides market
participants with strong incentives to check counterparty creditworthi-
ness, and thereby develop internal expertise on derivatives. Such in-
quiries would be less forcefully undertaken if the market were
regulated. This is especially true if a clearinghouse system were re-
quired, as the SEC has advocated. 4 ' It would also open up the mar-
ket to even less sophisticated investors than the institutions that have,
at least as alleged in their lawsuits, turned out to be far more naive
than their resources otherwise suggested.249 Less sophisticated deal-
ers would enter as well, because the less well-capitalized firms kept out
of the current market would benefit from a clearinghouse guarantee.
There is a real question whether some of the eligible participants,
particularly governmental entities, are truly competent to play in the
game.25 ° Rather than restrict their participation in these markets,251
or turn dealers into insurers through expanding suitability rules-
strategies that would raise derivatives' costs to competent as well as
incompetent investors-I would focus on improving the investment
247. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-52, 91-112
(1993)
248. Bank Derivatives Activities Hearing-Part 3, supra note 110, at 453 (SEC staff submission
to Rep. Leach).
249. For example, as mandated by Congress, the CFTC's exemption for swaps pertains
only to "appropriate" investors, consisting of classes of institutional investors considered to
be sophisticated. CFTC Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1995). This
restriction would no longer exist were the swap market to come under CFTC regulation.
250. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 909 (W. Va. 1995)
(noting that State's losses on government securities were caused in part by inexperienced
staff); Ruth Simon, Why Your Town Could Get Stung Like Orange County, MONEY, Feb. 1, 1995,
at 20 (asserting that government entities' investment staffs are typically ill-trained, over-
worked, and operating under inadequate oversight).
251. Prohibiting government entities from participating in the derivative market would
be politically difficult. The futures exchanges' effort to obtain an exemption for profes-
sional trading analogous to the swap exemption, see supra text accompanying note 163, was
opposed by the Government Finance Officers Association, which, as a corollary, did not
want to be excluded from any markets and "called any attempts by 'federal regulators to
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1722 (Dec. 23, 1994).
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
decision-making capacity and internal controls of these entities. This
could be accomplished by having trade associations, such as the Gov-
ernment Finance Officers Association, develop guidelines of good
practices, including the hiring of investment managers or consultants
with adequate expertise to evaluate proposed strategies and the calcu-
lation of the market value of derivative holdings on a frequent peri-
odic basis.252 Periodic revaluation would, for instance, enable
supervisors to identify problem investments early on and prevent staff,
in the hope that the market will reverse course, from building up
huge loss cumulations, as occurred in the Orange County fiasco. Im-
proved internal controls are, of course, not substitutes for informed
and competent personnel. To the extent local governments cannot
employ adequately trained investment personnel, restricted invest-
ment choices or suitability standards may be necessary. But such strat-
egies will greatly increase municipalities' expenses as either they will
be unable to hedge interest rate risk effectively or they will be charged
higher prices by broker-dealers fearing liability.
As this Article has indicated, many derivative instruments are fed-
erally regulated, although the overall regulatory scheme is haphazard
and dispersed across several regulators. Regulatory fragmentation is
not inherently a problem. It may well have contributed to the impres-
sive innovation in U.S. derivative product markets over the past de-
cades.253 Moreover, the core uses of derivative instruments, detailed
in this Article, to achieve risk-management objectives, are sharply dis-
tinct from those of securities, which are issued for capital formation
purposes. Consequently, merging the regulatory regimes, as some
have recommended,254 would not appreciably facilitate regulation.
For example, separate staffs specializing in the different markets
would be necessary. This is frequently the case in countries where
there is only one agency regulating securities and futures. 255
As former CFTC Chairman Philip Johnson pointed out, the regu-
lator of an unpopular industry itself becomes unpopular. 56 That tru-
ism, no doubt, contributes to the recurring proposals to absorb the
CFTC into the SEC because its clientele, speculators, have never risen
252. See Simon, supra note 250, at 20.
253. See Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURE MARKETS 367, 383-84 (1984);
Ernest Bloch, Multiple Regulators: Their Constituencies and Policies, in MARKET MAKING AND
THE CHANGING STRUcTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 155, 175-76 (Yakov Amihud et al.
eds., 1985).
254. See, e.g., H.R. 718, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
255. Johnson, supra note 117, at 119.
256. Id.
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to heroic status in the public imagination. Readers of this Article, it is
hoped, will overcome the tendency to let the opacity of derivatives
and the intimate connection between derivative markets and specula-
tors carry the day in arguments over regulatory policy, and will instead
require reform proposals to be grounded in sound policy
considerations.
